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THE ADVOCATE AS LAWMAKER: LUIS KUTNER
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DUE PROCESS
ERNEST KATIN*
"One can wear the well-concealed armor of Sir Galahad in help-
ing to conquer the dragons of evil and injustice."
Luis Kutner**
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The lawyer is the indispensable middleman of social progress.' His
role is varied; he is legislator, advisor, arbitrator and judge. Perhaps his
most effective contribution is as an advocate in championing the cause
of a client who has been wronged. It is in the tradition of the advocate
that the legal profession emerges in its most vital role.
Romantically, the lawyer is pictured as taking the unpopular cause,
like John Adams' defense of British soldiers accused of murder in the
Boston Massacre,' or in Clarence Darrow's, Louis Brandeis', and Louis
Marshall's championing of the public interest in opposing the privileged
and the powerful. Unfortunately, however, these shining knights do not
typify most members of the legal profession who prefer to concentrate
merely in comfortable income-producing pursuits, shunning the controver-
sial. But the romantic image still beckons, as demonstrated today by the
many capable law graduates who seek to dedicate their careers to public
service.8
The advocate makes law. He cannot follow the prototype of the
Organization Man in uncritically accepting premises as given and con-
* Member of the Illinois and Minnesota Bars; LL.B., University of Minnesota Law
School; Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Minnesota; Author of Griswold v. Con-
necticut: The Justices and the Uncommonly Silly Law, NOTRE DAME LAWYER (June 1967).
** L. KUTNER, I, THE LAWYER (1966) at ix.
1. Brennan, The Responsibilities of the Legal Profession, 54 A.B.A.J. 148 (1968).
2. Williamson, John Adams, Counsellor of Courage, 54 A.B.A.J. 148 (1968).
3. Brennan, supra note 1.
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forming to an established behavioral norm.4 He may not approach the
cause of his client with a negative attitude. Even if legal precedent is
clearly to the contrary, he must create a strategem to distinguish his
client's case or to change the law. The true advocate does not accept the
law as settled. To him the law remains unsettled if it is not settled
correctly. This is a position which may well run counter to that taken by
the judge or the legislator-and of most lawyers-who may prefer to
allow matters to remain merely resolved.5 The advocate, in zealously
presenting his client's case, will attempt to demonstrate that the settled
law produces an unjust result-an outcome which would shock the
conscience. As an adversary, he develops a different perspective of the
problem from that of the judge, so that he can present new insights
which the judge is compelled to consider. Clearly, the advocate, func-
tioning within the context of the adversary system, assumes a vital
role in the process of rendering justice.
Where the advocate perceives a problem which must be rectified,
he will not limit his activities merely to the court room. He will be ready
to champion reform by calling the attention of his colleagues and the
general public to the existence of the problem and in proposing a solution.
He will use the law reviews as a sounding board for proposing strategies
for change through legislation or by adopting new legal precedents. Louis
Dembitz Brandeis' famous Harvard Law Review article in collaboration
with a colleague at the turn of the century is a classic example of how
an advocate managed to blaze the trail for a new tort which has now
become a constitutional right-privacy6
In today's world, the practice of the advocate is not limited to his
own country. The problems of the nation and the world demand solution.
Like Tolstoy and Ghandi, he must feel responsible for the evil existing
in the world and cannot remain idle while his brother suffers. Because of
4. See generally W. WHYTE, THE ORGANIZATION MAN (1956). The writer recalls that, as
a law student, many students were uneasy in encountering the Socratic method, preferring to
be spoonfed with given facts with which they felt secure. The writer also found this to be
true in teaching college students.
5. Dr. Judith Sklar has asserted,
All judges must sooner or later legislate-create rules either unconsciously or
openly. . . . To the judge, however, these are frightful occasions. By training and
professional ideology he is tied to a vision of his function that excludes self assertion
and places a premium on following existing rules impartially. His natural impulse is
to find a rule at any cost, or at least to assimilate his decision to a rule as closely
as possible. He may even openly evade responsibility. . . . [Ilt is obviously of great
importance to him that the rules he relies on be based on universal agreement among
either the experts, the wise, or the whole people. Otherwise the rule becomes a mere
opinion-a thought he does not wish to entertain ...
SKLAR, LEGALISM 101-102 (1964).
Holmes, in commenting on lawyers, stated:
I cannot but believe that if the training of lawyers led them habitually to consider
more definitely and explicitly the social advantage on which the rule they lay down
must be justified, they sometimes would hesitate where now they are confident and
say that really they were taking sides upon debatable and often burning questions.
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 468 (1897).
6. See generally A. MASON, BRANDEIS, A FREE MAN's LIFE (1946).
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his training and his peculiar talents, he has a specific responsibility as
his brother's keeper. He cannot ask-"Who am I?"-in disclaiming
responsibility.
Unfortunately, in the writer's opinion, most lawyers are apathetic,
preferring the security of the routine and the mechanical in drafting
wills and deeds, enforcing judgments on creditors, litigating personal
injury claims, filing tax returns and getting couples divorced. Though in
these pursuits, the lawyer does perform a public service, much more is
involved in the pursuit of a law career if it is to be regarded as a profes-
sion. The lawyer, if he is to attain his self-fulfillment, as a person and as
a member of a profession, must engage in the creative and realize the
satisfaction of public service.
Here and there throughout the land there are lawyers who truly
regard their profession with a sense of obligation. They seek the creative
and wish to make the world a better place in which to live.
Luis Kutner, a Chicago attorney, is a case in point.
He does not profess to be the greatest or most capable lawyer in
his city or in the nation, though he is capable of, at least, holding his own
against any adversary in any controversy. Kutner, a wrestler, painter,
musician, historian, poet, and biographer, regards a legal challenge as a
creative activity. To him the law must provide a remedy for every wrong,
every injustice; and if legal precedent has not provided it, he is prepared
to create precedent in the fashioning of a new remedy. In pursuing this
cause, Kutner has willingly taken on cases without a fee and at great
personal sacrifice, though ultimately his vindication of the right has re-
sulted in such fame as to enrich him monetarily and to expand his
law practice.
Kutner has also sought to change the law through imaginative legis-
lative proposals presented in law journal articles. His practice knows no
boundaries. His most sustained creative endeavor (since 1931) has been
the movement for World Habeas Corpus to provide a summary inter-
national remedy and adjudication by duly constituted regional interna-
tional tribunals for any individual anywhere in the world who is illegally
or arbitrarily detained.
His legal outlook was affected by a traumatic experience which oc-
curred when he was twelve years old. He had gone angling for goldfish
in a Chicago park pond with some friends, and a policeman arrested him
and threw him into a basement cell in the Park Police Station. Kutner
and his young friends were kept in the cell over the weekend for almost
72 hours. The jail was dark with several inches of water covering the
floor and rats swarming about, their eyes shining. His parents were
totally unaware as to what had happened. The experience was forever im-
planted in his mind. Kutner developed a special feeling for the person
who is arbitrarily and illegally detained and became particularly sensi-
tive to injustice.
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This article is devoted to an evaluation of Kutner's urgent quest
for impartial justice and the due process of law as manifested through
his writings and cases. Certain significant articles and cases have been
selected from a legal career which spans more than thirty-five years in
presenting an over-all case study of what one lawyer has contributed to
the lawmaking decision process.
I. WORLD HABEAS CORPUS
Habeas Corpus and Luis Kutner are synonymous.
He has used this writ to free over a thousand persons. However, his
proposal for the use of this writ as an international remedy is most revo-
lutionary. Kutner developed expertise in the use of this remedy while
serving as secretary and law clerk to Judge Frank Comerford in the
Criminal Courts of Chicago. Persons were arrested on suspicion of having
committed a crime and shifted from one jail to another or charged and
made to languish in a county jail cell for months without the case being
presented for a hearing. Habeas Corpus was the remedy for compelling
authorities to reveal where the prisoner was being held and to inquire
into the legality of his detention. When state remedies have been ex-
hausted, the federal remedy emerged as a buckler and shield.
In 1930, Kutner encountered the rise of Nazism in Germany with
the repeated, publicized spectacle of thousands of arms raised in unison
like puppets. This image of the dynamic vitality of hate created a pro-
found impression upon the young lawyer. After a close study of Goering
and Goebels and Mein Kampf, Kutner was convinced that Nazism was
a world threat, that Jews were to be degraded, dehumanized and exter-
minated, and that human rights and the rule of law were about to be
trampled. After verifying his conclusions about the threat of Nazism
in 1931 this young lawyer toured the nation under the sponsorship of
the International Optimist Clubs warning Americans, and Jews in partic-
ular, of the looming threat of Hitler, only to be shrugged off. With
Hitler's appointment as Reich Chancellor, Kutner perceived the urgent
need for the international protection of individual rights.
His training and experience with the Writ of Habeas Corpus enabled
him to conceive of its use as an international remedy with recourse to ad-
judication by an international tribunal. Kutner confided his idea to Dean
Roscoe Pound, who became his mentor in attracting the support of noted
scholars and jurists, including John Dewey. He also received the active
cooperation of Harold D. Lasswell, Myres S. McDougal, Quincy Wright,
Judge Floyd Thompson, Dean Shailer Matthews and the then Attorney
General of the United States, Francis Biddle. The late George Cardinal
Mundelein reacted enthusiastically. Kutner, expending his own funds,
convened conferences of distinguished scholars and judges to develop
the concepts of World Habeas Corpus and formed the Commission for
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International Due Process of Law with Dean Roscoe Pound and Hans
Kelsen as honorary counsel and world policy and executive committees
consisting of such prestigious names as Associate Supreme Court Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr., Judge Caroline Simon of New York, General
Telford Taylor, Louis B. Sohn, Egon Schwelb and others, along with
those who have supported the movement from its inception. Chief
Justices and other jurists throughout the world have joined as sponsors
with seminars having been held in India, Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan,
Greece, France, Italy and elsewhere. The commission is now affiliated
with the World Peace Through Law Center and has the support of the
American Bar Association. The proposal of World Habeas Corpus has
received serious consideration and endorsement from Ambassador Arthur
J. Goldberg.7
Kutner and his associates have elaborated upon World Habeas
Corpus extensively in law review articles8 and in a book which has been
published by the Oceana Press.9 To Kutner, World Habeas Corpus is a
legal ligament for international order in providing protection for the in-
dividual as a subject of international law. It is premised on the concept
that man, as the subject of international law should have his individ-
ual security guaranteed by an international treaty-statute enforceable rule
of law involving a concession of national sovereignty but without the im-
pairment of the sovereignty of states. The proposal does not involve the
establishment of world government, though it is not incompatible with
such proposals. Nation states would still remain the prime actors in
international society.
The proposal for World Habeas Corpus urges that respect for human
rights is a shared value for world order expressed in diverse and competi-
tive legal systems and national constitutions. ° The protection for human
7. L. KUTNER, I, THE LAWYER 105 (1967). The author refers to personal conversations
with Kutner and to personal observations.
8. Brennan, International Due Process and the Law, 48 VA. L. REV. 1258 (1962);
Kefauver, International Due Process and the Law, 108 CONG. REC. A6774 (daily ed. Sept. 13,
1962); Kutner, World Habeas Corpus, Human Rights and World Community, 17 DE PAUL
L. REV. 3 (1967); Kutner, Due Process of Family Privacy: World Civil Liberty and World
Habeas Corpus, 28 U. PITT. L. REV. 597 (1967); Kutner, 'International' Due Process for
Prisoners of War: The Need for a Special Tribunal of World Habeas Corpus, 21 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 721 (1967); Kutner, World Habeas Corpus: The Legal Ultimate for the Unity of
Mankind, 40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 570 (1965); Kutner, WORLD HABEAS CORPUS: A LEGAL
LIGAMENT FOR POLIncAL DIVERSITY (Washington World Conference on World Peace Through
Law, 1965); Kutner, World Habeas Corpus and International Extradition, 41 U. DET. L.J.
525 (1964) ; Kutner & Carl, An International Writ of Habeas Corpus: Protection of Personal
Liberty in a World of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 22 U. PITT. L. REv. 469 (1961) ;
Kutner, World Habeas Corpus for International Man: A Credo for International Due Process
of Law, 36 U. DET. L.J. 235 (1959); Comment, World Habeas Corpus, 7 INDIAN L.Q. REV.
1173 (1962).
9. L. KUTNER, WORLD HABEAS CORPUS (1962). Reissued in paperback in 1967. [Herein-
after cited as WORLD HABEAS CORPUS.]
10. See generally Kutner, World Habeas Corpus: The Legal Ultimate for the Unity of
Mankind, 40 NOTRE DAM LAW. 570 (1965).
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rights has been expressed in international law by the Nuremberg Prin-
ciples, the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and other international covenants, conventions, agreements and
declarations. A means must be found for implementing these rights, and
particularly the basic right of freedom from arbitrary arrest and deten-
tion. Habeas Corpus and analogous remedies, such as the Latin and South
American Amparo, have been adopted by most legal systems." Never-
theless, shocking instances have arisen where human rights have been
brutally denied and individuals have been arbitrarily arrested and de-
tained. World Habeas Corpus is proposed as a summary remedy.
Kutner's proposal seeks adherence to a universal standard of respect
for human rights while taking account of cultural diversities as expressed
in diverse legal systems. Implementing F. S. C. Northrop's suggestion
as to the existence of distinct cultural-legal units, 2 Kutner proposes
establishing regional circuit courts of World Habeas Corpus to hear cases
within each arena of states having a common cultural and legal heritage.
He proposes nine circuits consisting of: (1) a Communist-Orient Circuit;
(2) USSR-East Europe Circuit; (3) Western Europe Circuit; (4) Islam
Circuit; (5) Southern Africa Circuit; (6) Australia and Oceanic Circuit;
(7) Non-Communist Orient Circuit; (8) Latin America Circuit; and (9)
Anglo-America Circuit. Individuals who are arbitrarily detained, upon
exhaustion of all available domestic recourse, would be able, to have
the right to appeal to the appropriate regional tribunal for the adjudica-
tion of his rights with ultimate appeal to a world tribunal. The tribunals
would be staffed with lawyers capable of processing Writs of Habeas
Corpus. The tribunal would be empowered to order the detained person
to be brought before it and would determine whether he is being lawfully
detained in accordance with international respect for human rights, which
Kutner regards as comprising an "international due process of law."'"
Each circuit court would be composed of seven judges of whom at least
four must be nationals of a state located within the arena or region over
which the particular circuit has jurisdiction, with the remaining three
judges to be chosen from outside the particular arena. The Supreme Court
would be composed of nine justices-one judge from each circuit. Kutner
has drafted this proposal in the form of a treaty-statute. 4
This judicial structure and procedural system, according to Kutner,
would provide for review of individual cases of detention by judicial
decision-makers and offer a method by which the case may be brought
to the attention of world public opinion.15 Enforcement would be based
primarily upon the voluntary compliance of the states involved. Based
11. See generally Kutner & Carl, supra note 8.
12. NORTHROP, THE TAINto OF THE NATIONS (1952).
13. WORLD HABEAS CoRPus, supra note 9, at 75-77.
14. Versions of the Treaty-Statute appear in WORLD HABEAS CoaRpus supra note 9, at
266; 40 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 600 (1965); 39 U. DET. L.J. 331 (1962).
15. This theme is developed in the articles cited in note 8.
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on past adherence to decisions of international tribunals and the fact
that adjudication would be by a tribunal within a common cultural and
legal arena, states would be most likely to comply. He does, however,
concede that sanctions might be imposed upon a recalcitrant state by
the appropriate regional organization, such as the Organization of Ameri-
can States or the Security Council of the United Nations. The type of
enforcement action which would be undertaken would accord with
standards of reasonableness in considering the surrounding circumstances
of the particular case.
The proposal and the treaty-statute would, of course, be subject to
modifications before its ultimate adoption and implementation. For ex-
ample, the classification of states within the particular circuit is subject to
challenge. There is doubt as to whether Indonesia, an Islamic state,
should belong in the same circuit with Australia and the Philippines.
Furthermore, the Shiite Islamic states may prefer to separate themselves
from the Sunni states. Moreover, Kutner places some civil law countries
in the same circuit with common law countries, as in the Western Euro-
pean Circuit, Yugoslavia and Rumania may not wish to belong to the
same circuit as the Soviet Union.
World Habeas Corpus would not usher in the millennium. It would,
however, be an instrument for encouraging states to raise municipal stan-
dards respecting human rights. Some of the American and Western
European states adhere, however, to standards which exceed that set
by the international order. The number of cases which the World Habeas
Corpus tribunals would actually hear would be minimal, with the pro-
posed Supreme Court hearing even fewer petitions. This has been the
experience with the use of the Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus in the
United States Courts in passing upon the cases of prisoners sentenced
under state laws.'" Only a very small percentage of prisoner's petitions
are actually adjudicated, and an even smaller number are heard by the
Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the existence of the Federal Writ serves
a vital purpose, even if it vindicates the rights of one prisoner in a hun-
dred. Similarly, a Writ of World Habeas Corpus, even though offering
protection in only a few cases, would still be worthy of implementation.
Sir Winston Churchill had referred to World Habeas Corpus as "the
difference between civilization and tyranny."'" Justice Kotaro Tanaka
of the International Court of Justice, former Chief Justice of Japan,
believing that the Rule of Law should cover all the world and that "there
must be no vacuum in the protection of fundamental human rights," re-
gards World Habeas Corpus as "a primary requirement in the national
and international societies."' 8 Associate United States Supreme Court
16. In a nine-year period, from 1946 through 1954, only 79 or 1.6 per cent of 4,849
federal habeas corpus applications were granted. Hearings on H.R. 5649 Before Subcomm.
No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong. 1st Sess. 21 (1955).
17. Meeting at Claridge's, London, 1950.
18. Letter to Kutner, Jan. 20, 1967.
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Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., has characterized World Habeas Corpus
as ''a concrete program whereby the now only morally binding Universal
Declaration of Human Rights would be made, by the voluntary consent
of the nations of the world, a legally binding commitment enforceable
in an International Court of Habeas Corpus which would function
through appropriately accessible regional tribunals."' 9 Mr. Justice Bren-
nan further comments:
What is important is the obvious utility of world habeas corpus
as a tool for the avoidance of the dangers of the police state,
and its great promise as a contribution toward preserving and
furthering world peace by repudiating, through an enforcible
international rule of law, systematic and deliberate denial of
human rights. The plan requires no surrender of national sover-
eignty to a supranational state and there is more than a feeble
hope that the nations of the world would perceive that this plan
would indeed serve their national interests. For as Professor
Kutner has said: "If there are any denials of human rights
which all nations might in principle agree violate standards of
fairness, certainly arbitrary arrest, i.e., a wrongful custody
without color of legal justification, is one. If individuals may be
arrested or incarcerated without cause, or for causes which
clearly violate fundamental human rights, they do not have the
most elementary fundamental freedom.""
Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg has commented that "the idea of world
wide habeas corpus, internationally recognized and enforceable in an
international court, can only be applauded by those who are dedicated to
the rule of law and the attainment of lasting world peace."'"
Chief Justice Leonard V. B. Sutton of the Colorado Supreme Court'
and Professor Quincy Wright have praisingly commented upon the pro-
posal for World Habeas Corpus.
If World Habeas Corpus is to succeed it is obvious that the
detained or incarcerated individual, or someone on his behalf,
must be permitted to file and prosecute the petition. . . . [A]
good start in altering thinking along the necessary lines has been
made by the creation of the European Court of Human Rights.
Apparently, a second obstacle is the reluctance on the part of
some nations, including the United States, to agree to any loss
of individual sovereignty which is, to some extent, implicit in
adhering to the jurisdiction of any international judicial body.
Another serious stumbling block is that there does not appear to
be at this time any way to enforce the mandates of such courts.
In this connection, it has been suggested that sanctions are un-
19. Brennan, International Due Process and the Law, 48 VA. L. REV. 1258, 1260-61
(1962).
20. Id. (Emphasis added.)
21. Goldberg, An Introduction to World Habeas Corpus, 17 DE PAUL L. REV. 1 (1967).
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necessary. Proponents of this belief cite as examples the general
success of the few international tribunals which have functioned
heretofore, as well as the success of international arbitral boards.
They also refer to the European Common Market operations to
support the proposition that signatory nations will respect and
adhere to the judgments of an international judicial body. This
position, while it may be overly optimistic, may be somewhat
supported by the fact that there are very few recorded instances
of non-compliance with the judgments of the present Interna-
tional Court of Justice.
History teaches us that the progress of the human race has
always been one of struggle to achieve a better way of life, more
perfect justice and more peaceful existence. The writ of habeas
corpus has been one of the most potent weapons yet devised in
man's attempt to follow paths to these fundamental and rightful
goals. Mankind will somehow, some way, and hopefully very
soon, use this ancient, revered and versatile remedy to serve his
need for human freedom on an international basis. Surely, Re-
gional International Courts of Habeas Corpus are within reach.
Once created and obeyed, they will permit those who in good
faith adhere to the precepts of the United Nations Charter, to
see to it that at least in their countries there is protection against
arbitrary arrest and unlawful detention. Hopefully, this safe-
guard can gradually be extended to all men everywhere. 2
Professor Quincy Wright (a long time mentor of Kutner) has stated:
World Habeas Corpus, which would provide an interna-
tional remedy against arbitrary arrest and detention of individ-
uals, is a fundamental requirement of human justice. Does the
law of the Charter permit its realization? The Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, accepted by the General Assembly
without dissent in 1948, by prohibiting arbitrary arrest, deten-
tion, or exile (Article 9) and demanding a fair and public
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal on all charges
(Article 10) accepts World Habeas Corpus in principle, and
the draft Covenant of Civil and Political Rights approved by
the General Assembly would convert this principle into a legal
obligation of the ratifying states (Article 9). The legal problem
is how to achieve general ratification of the Covenant and to
establish a tribunal with adequate competence to issue and en-
force a writ of Habeas Corpus all over the world. . . . [T]he
traditional concept of state sovereignty, the prevailing sentiment
of nationalism, the different conditions of civil order, and the
different beliefs in respect to it in the different nations, present
difficulties to such achievement.23
22. Sutton, Habeas Corpus-Its Past, Present and Possible World-Wide Future, 44
DENVER L.J. 548, 556-57 (1967). (Footnotes omitted.)
23. Wright, Steps in the Realization of World Habeas Corpus, [Unpubl. paper].
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The proposal for World Habeas Corpus was particularly revolu-
tionary when it was first formulated in the early 1930's when the senti-
ments for isolationism predominated. Human rights was still regarded
as a matter of essentially domestic jurisdiction and to be of no interna-
tional concern, except as affecting the rights of aliens. However, certain
precedents regarding the international protection of human rights had
been established with the Hague Conventions on the rules of warfare,
the International Labor Organization Conventions, the League of Nations
Mandates System and the provisions of treaties with Central and Eastern
European states protecting the rights of minorities.24 Nevertheless, the
Covenant of the League of Nations did not provide for the protection of
human rights, and Hitler was able to successfully claim international
immunity for his brutalities by asserting the rights of national sover-
eignty.25
The most radical aspect of World Habeas Corpus is in conferring
rights upon the individual who is made a subject of international law. He,
or somebody acting in his behalf, is to assume the initiative to activate
the international judicial machinery. Traditionally, international law
regards the individual as a mere object of international law with no stand-
ing before international tribunals and no means for engaging in inter-
national diplomacy. Only a state could act on his behalf within the
international order." However, precedents have occurred in international
practice which tend to enhance the status of the individual in the inter-
national legal order so that the proposal for World Habeas Corpus is no
longer radical.
The Nuremberg Charter and the War Crimes Trials have made
individuals personally responsible for acts which they have committed
which offend the conscience of international order. A corollary to individ-
ual responsibility should inevitably be the assertion of individual rights.
Another factor is the growing concern of the common man with the
advent of the welfare state. The welfare of the common man has become
a major concern of international policies as expressed politically and
ideologically in the international covenants of human rights. International
machinery for economic and social welfare has been established, includ-
ing the International Labor Organization, the Food and Agriculture
Organization, and the World Health Organization.17
The United Nations Charter, unlike the Covenant of the League of
Nations, specifically provides for the international protection of human
rights as expressed in the Preamble, reaffirming faith "in fundamental
24. Kutner, World Habeas Corpus, Human Rights and World Community, 17 DE PAUL
L. REV. 3, 23 (1967).
25. Id.
26. St. Korowicz, The Problem of the International Personality of Individuals, 50 Am.
J. INT'L L. 533, 561 (1956).
27. W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 217 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as FRIEDMANN).
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human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal
rights of men and women, and of nations large and small." Article 1,
paragraph 3, declares that one of the purposes of the United Nations
is to achieve "international cooperation in solving international problems
of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in pro-
moting and encouraging respect for human rights for all without dis-
tinction as to race, sex, language and religion." Article 55, paragraph (c)
lists the promotion of "universal respect for and observance of human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language or religion" as one of the basic functions of the United
Nations. This, when coupled with Article 56, which states that "all mem-
bers pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation
with the organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in
Article 55(a)," has led text writers to conclude that member states are
obliged to protect the fundamental rights of their subjects.2" Article 2,
paragraph 7, which precludes the United Nations from interfering in
matters which are "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state," has not prevented the United Nations and the international com-
munity from taking action to protect human rights. A growing recogni-
tion has developed that the protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms is directly related to the promotion of world peace and that
the denial of human rights is a threat to peace."
The meaning of "fundamental rights and human freedoms" has been
elaborated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Though the
Declaration may not originally have been intended to have binding effect,
its unanimous adoption by the General Assembly, its invocation in sub-
sequent General Assembly resolutions, and its incorporation in the con-
stitutions of many states have made it a part of customary international
law. 1o Article 9 of the Declaration provides that "no one shall be subject
to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile;" while Article 3 provides that
"everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person." The
Human Rights Commission of the United Nations has adopted a Cove-
nant setting forth international standards for a fair trial." Clearly, inter-
national law provides that the rights of the individual should be protected
from police-state-like actions. Within this context World Habeas Corpus
emerges as a concrete remedy. When rights are recognized, it is axiomatic
that a remedy be recognized.
28. Lauterpacht, Human Rights, the Charter of the United Nations and the International
Bill of Rights of Man, ch. 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/89 (1948); GANjr, INTERNATIONAL PROTEC-
TION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ch. IV (1962); CHAKRAVARTI, HUM!hAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED
NATIONS 47-51 (1958).
29. Henkin, The United Nations and Human Rights, 19 INT'L ORG. 504 (1965).
30. GARDNER, IN PURSUIT OF WORLD ORDER 241-42 (1965).
31. This is discussed in Harris, The Right to a Fair Trial in Criminal Proceedings as a
Human Right, 16 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 352 (1967), who also points out that standards for a
fair trial are also expressed in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Declara-
tion on the Rights of Man of the Organization of American States.
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The individual's status in international law has been further en-
hanced with the emergence of new subjects. Since World War I, inter-
national organizations have been recognized to have a special status
which was affirmed by an Advisory Opinion of the International Court
in the Bernadotte Case. 32 Legal personality has been specifically con-
ferred upon the specialized agencies by their respective charters. Many
other functional and regional organizations have been recognized to have
international personality.33 Corporations have been recognized to have a
certain international status when created subject to international treaties
or conventions, such as Eurofirma and Eurochemic 4
Precedents granting rights to individuals to sue another state di-
rectly include the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals established between each
allied state and Germany by the Versailles Treaty, the Advisory Opinion
of the Permanent Court of Justice concerning the jurisdiction of the
courts of Danzig, 5 and the German-Polish Upper Silesia Convention
which established an Arbitral Tribunal entrusted with the duty of settling
private disputes.36 Another significant development of international prac-
tice has been the European Convention on European Rights which estab-
lished a Commission to which alleged violations may be reported by a
member state or by individuals and which functions as a quasi-judicial
body in handling these disputes and a European Court of Human
Rights before which either member states or the Commission may bring
cases concerning the application of the Convention. 7
Clearly, the growing tendency towards transnational contact be-
tween individuals and groups in a world which is becoming more tightly
linked has led to an enhancement of the individual in the international
legal order. However, the individual's position as a subject of interna-
tional law is dependent on the treaties and conventions entered by
nation states. Likewise, the proposal for World Habeas Corpus would
enhance the position of the individual by a treaty-statute conforming
to an evolutionary state practice.
Kutner attempted to have the phrase World Habeas Corpus incor-
porated into the United Nations Charter at the San Francisco Confer-
ence. Eleanor Roosevelt and Senator Warren Austin claimed the matter
was discussed, but the Soviet delegation had opposed this inclusion.
Later, however, Kutner recalls, Andrei Vishinsky, who had participated
in the drafting of the Charter, asserted that he approved of the concept
of World Habeas Corpus but because of his position observed it was
32. [1949] I.C.J. REP. 174.
33. FRIEDMANN, supra note 27 at 217.
34. FRIEDMANN, id. at 14.
35. FRIEDMANN, id. at 239.
36. See generally KAECKENBEECx, THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIMENT OF UPPER SILESIA
(1942).
37. FRIEDMANN, supra note 27, at 243.
ADVOCATE AS LAWMAKER
"politically inexpedient." Whether the idea would have been acceptable
to the United States Senate at that time (1945) is also questionable.
Kutner, however, attempted to invoke the Writ of Habeas Corpus
through existing international institutions. He tested this approach in
three instances involving the detentions of Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty,
William N. Oatis and Moise Tshombe.
Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty had been arrested by Hungarian au-
thorities, held incommunicado, denied the right to perform the functions
of his Church and was subjected to interrogations which led to a con-
fession of various crimes.38 He was sentenced to life imprisonment by the
Peoples Court of Hungary on seven charges which included disloyalty,
sedition and certain currency offenses. The arrest, detention and sentence
were regarded as an attack upon the Catholic Church in Hungary and
became a focal point for world-wide condemnation. Diplomatic and other
protests proved unavailing. Kutner, even though not a Catholic, was
consulted by prominent Church leaders as to possible legal action. He
conceived of a petition for a Writ of World Habeas Corpus before the
United Nations as the only possible remedy. Though Hungary at the
time was not a signatory of the United Nations Charter, Article 2 of the
Treaty of Peace of September 15, 1947, obligated her to take all measures
necessary to secure to all persons the enjoyment of human rights and fun-
damental freedoms, including the right to religious freedom. The proper
forum for hearing the case was the General Assembly, many of whose
members had received guarantees from the Hungarian Government and
who thus had an interest in the matter. Kutner prepared a memorandum
which was widely circulated. Church leaders hesitated to proceed, feeling
that a petition to the United Nations should be made only if there was
assurance it would indeed result in the Cardinal's freedom and that
hostility by other religions would defeat the action. The idea was timidly
shelved.
The efficacy of World Habeas Corpus was first tested with the pe-
tition for the release of William N. Oatis from detention by Czechoslo-
vakia." Oatis, an Associated Press newsman, was arrested by Czech
authorities in 1951 at his apartment in the early hours of the morning
without a warrant, without being informed of the nature of the charges
against him, and within one week after his permit to remain in Czecho-
slovakia as an accredited newsman had been renewed. His arrest had not
become known for 72 hours, and he was denied counsel. The American
Embassy in Prague was denied permission to contact him. Oatis was
brought to trial on purported charges of having engaged in activities
hostile to the state, gathering and disseminating information considered
secret by Czechoslovakia, and spreading malicious information regarding
the Czech states through illegal news organs for which purpose he
38. This case is discussed in WORLD HABEAS CoRPus, supra note 9, at 99-102.
39. Id. at 102-109. The text of the Petition is at 244.
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misused Czech authorities. From the time he was taken into custody until
the time of his trial he was denied permission to speak, consult or contact
any American official to prepare for trial. He was, subjected to repeated
interrogations to extort a confession, conforming to the then prevailing
pattern of Communist trials.4" At the trial a five-man court assigned
counsel to represent him who, in fact, prosecuted the defendant after he
was induced to plead guilty. No diplomatic observers were permitted at
the trial. A period of a year of diplomatic negotiations proved unsuccess-
ful.
In May 1952, Kutner addressed, through Eleanor Roosevelt, a pe-
tition for a Writ of World Habeas Corpus to the United Nations Eco-
nomic and Social Council which was accompanied by a petition to the
General Assembly, including a request that the United States join as a
party-movant. The Human Rights Commission advised that the request
that the United States join as a party-movant was granted and
that the petition was filed with copies served upon the respondent
Czechoslovakia. The State Department took no action to reject the
proposal, though Dean Acheson, the then Secretary of State, doubted its
"workability." However, a number of international law scholars, in-
cluding Quincy Wright and Hans Kelsen, found a basis for the action
under Article 56, which requires all members to take joint and separate
action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the
purposes in Article 55, which includes universal respect for and ob-
servance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The State De-
partment took no action to dissociate itself from the petition and the
documents presented, though it did not act to press the petition.
The petition alleged the facts surrounding the arrest, detention and
trial of Oatis with the proceedings characterized as "a shabby conviction
and a sham or pretense of a legal trial and a denial of liberty and inter-
national justice."'" Jurisdiction of the General Assembly was claimed in
that "under the Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights any per-
son on earth, and particularly a citizen of a nation subscribing to the
UN Charter, has the right, either individually, or in association with
others, to petition (or by other process to communicate with) the au-
thorities of the United Nations to remedy a wrong committed by another
nation that deprives him of his liberty or human rights." The United
Nations is claimed to have a special responsibility to implement human
rights and that all signatory states assume the legal and moral obligation
to guarantee citizens of all nations found within their national borders
their rights "to life, liberty and property, equality before the law, im-
munity from torture and inhuman punishment, presumption of innocence,
40. The Czech regime at this time had also conducted a purge trial of prominent Com-
munist leaders, such as Rudolph Slansky, who were induced to confess. Recently, however,
the Czech government has admitted that these individuals were wrongfully convicted and
sentenced to death. Chicago Tribune, Feb. 18, 1968, Sec. 1A, at 1.
41. Text on CONG. REC. 5035 (daily ed. May 8, 1952).
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a fair and open trial, the right and choice of counsel, no ex post facto
laws, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the freedom of
assembly." The petition alleged that "the General Assembly has the
inherent power to create the methods, vehicles or organs to carry out the
objects and purposes of the United Nations by virtue of the Charter and
the Declaration of Human Rights."
The petition then quotes extensively from the Charter regarding
human rights and sets out the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
As Alternative Jurisdiction, the Oatis petition alleges:
The General Assembly makes policies and is he parliament of
the world. It has the responsibility of recommending United
Nations action at any time to execute its purpose to build a
better world for all peoples and especially to preserve and pro-
tect human rights.
The General Assembly has the inherent power under the pro-
vision of the Charter to initiate appropriate measures to restrain
and rectify threats and deprivations of human rights to each
and every individual on the face of the globe.
The General Assembly has the power and jurisdiction to affirm
the basic principles of international law as they have existed for
more than 6,000 years and as a tribunal create its own power
and procedures to enforce preservation of fundamental human
rights.
The General Assembly is the sole judge of its own competence in
its assumption of jurisdictional responsibility to enforce separate
and collective human rights under the Charter.
As Correlative Jurisdiction, reference is made to the International Court
of Justice and to Articles 104 and 105 of the Charter referring to the
legal capacity and privileges and immunities enjoyed by the United
Nations as an international organization in the territories of the member
states.
The petition then makes a series of contentions regarding Oatis'
trial, alleging that Czechoslovakia, by violating the concept of human
rights which it is obligated to protect and to preserve, violated "the inter-
national concept of due process principle" in denying Oatis a fair trial
and also violated another concept of due process known to international
law, "the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the
very concept of justice." The petition alleges that Oatis was denied due
process of law as guaranteed by the Charter and the Declaration on
Human Rights and "that the respondent signatory Czechoslovakia be
denied the right to indulge in any technical jurisdictional arguments in
restraint of liberty." Habeas Corpus is asserted to be the only remedy
available for seeking relief.
The petition then concludes with an impassioned argument for
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issuing the Writ of World Habeas Corpus, alleging that the remedy lies
within the fabric and jurisdictional scope of the Charter of the United
Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Court of Justice, and the Security Council and that "guilty signatories
to the United Nations Charter can be bound by any ruling through the
competent tribunal." Reference is made to the use of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus as a sword and shield to protect individual liberty as derived from
the Magna Carta, with the United Nations Charter characterized as a
"Magna Carta of the world family of nations" and "constitution of world
interdependence" and, being cosmopolitical in nature, requires a "cos-
mojudicial writ for all humans on the globe." Kutner argues further
that his petition for the United Nations Writ of Habeas Corpus is the first
of its kind under the Charter, and the first in legal history, and that,
under the basic law of habeas corpus, can be filed by anyone. The
petition argues that the General Assembly may by resolution order
Czechoslovakia to show cause and by what legal rights Oatis was being
detained and then refer the matter to an appropriate organ or the Inter-
national Court for an advisory opinion while requesting the Human
Rights Commission to gather the relevant facts. The petition argues
that the Court should issue the writ commanding Czechslovakia to
produce Oatis in open court and submit to the testing of the legality of
his detention and to proceed ex parte if Czechoslovakia refuses to comply.
As precedent, Kutner's petition refers to the nonrestrictive basis of
interpretation of the International Court's advisory opinions in the Tunis,
Morocco cases and. its conducting of hearings into the treatment of
Indians in the Union of South Africa, action in the Indonesian question,
the Palestine question, "and others." Reference is made to the procedure
of the Anglo-Iranian controversy. As further authority, Article 10 of the
tentative draft Covenant of Human Rights is cited as indicative of
procedures for the right of a fair trial. The argument is made that a
precedent could be established by issuing a writ of World Habeas Corpus
in behalf of Oatis.
Members of Congress considered it significant that the Human
Rights Commission did entertain the petition and did not dismiss it
summarily. The matter languished for a year in the Human Rights Com-
mission. Then the delegation of the Dominican Republic, headed by
Rafael Trujillo, proposed placing a resolution before an appropriate
(political action) committee of the United Nations in which it would
have intervened as a party-movant requesting an advisory opinion from
the International Court of Justice as to the appropriateness of the peti-
tion with Human Rights Commission prosecuting the case and proposing
that the United Nations adopt World Habeas Corpus as a definitive
legal procedure4 2 to implement the human rights provisions of the Charter
42. WORLD HABEAS CoRPus, supra note 9, at 104.
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and the Declaration. The State Department requested a thirty-day delay,
and Oatis was dramatically released in the interim.
Obviously, the extent to which Kutner's activities was a factor in
obtaining Oatis' freedom was immediately acclaimed. Congressman John
Beamer of Indiana contended that the pressures mounted for a United
Nations Writ of World Habeas Corpus in keeping the case before the
"conscience of mankind" greatly contributed to the release in that
Czechoslovakia did not want to face a showdown. Though Kutner ob-
served that "it is not unrealistic to contend that but for these pressures,
Oatis would still be held in prison," other factors may have also played
a part. Stalin had died; a thaw had developed behind the Iron Curtain;
and the release of Oatis was a means for reducing international tension.
Kutner notes that to have pursued the matter through the United Nations
would have taken five years of legal maneuvering.
The arguments presented in the petition might have been subject
to challenge. To characterize the General Assembly as a world parlia-
ment was bold and challenging. It is composed of plenipotentiaries of
sovereign states, functioning as an instrument of international diplomacy.
General Assembly resolutions, under the Charter, are not binding upon
the members, having only the effect of recommendations. However, where
the Assembly solemnly adopts a declaration by virtually unanimous vote,
the result may, on occasion, be an expression of a norm of international
law. This does not mean, however, that the Assembly legislates." Such
a norm was asserted with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights which has become of binding effect subsequent to its
adoption, though its legal delineations may have been unclear at the
time Kutner had filed his Oatis petition.
Notwithstanding serious doubt as to whether the International
Court would have assumed jurisdiction to hear the matter, Kutner cut
through the curtain of archaic historicity. The Court will historically
refrain from hearing a matter unless both parties accede to its jurisdic-
tion, so that without the participation of Czechoslovakia, the Court would
refuse to hear the matter ex parte." Moreover,, in view of the decision
in the Southwest Africa case, 45 only the United States, as a party-movant,
would have standing to bring the matter before the Court, alleging that
an injury was perpetrated upon one of its nationals. The dissenting
opinion of Justice Tanaka (a vigorous supporter of World Habeas
Corpus) in the Southwest Africa case4" tends to support Kutner's position
in arguing that a matter involving the protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms is an established international law norm affecting
43. Lande, The Effect of the Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, 19
WORLD PomTncs 83 (1966).
44. See generally Gross, Bulgaria Invokes the Connally Amendment, 56 Am. J. INT'L L.
357 (1962).
45. South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, [1966] I.C.J.
46. Id. at 250.
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the interests of all subjects. But this is not yet the legally institutionalized
prevailing position. Though the General Assembly could have asked the
International Court for an advisory opinion as to the efficacy of using
habeas corpus or analogous procedures, this would not have determined
the legality of Oatis' detention and would not have binding effect.
Conceivably, the General Assembly of the United Nations or the
Human Rights Commission could form an ad hoc tribunal to hear the
matter and reach a decision. Such a tribunal might even act ex parte if
Czechoslovakia should refuse to participate. But such a determination
could only be enforced by Security Council action which would very
likely be blocked by a Soviet veto. Nevertheless, a determination by an
impartial tribunal may have a moral effect.
The American State Department, which was eager to obtain Oatis'
release, would, of course, not be inclined to oppose Kutner's efforts, nor
would it be inclined to dissociate itself from any initiative. However,
Kutner's petition would have had greater significance if the State De-
partment had overcome its traditional indecision and had actively joined
as a party-movant. The fact that the Human Rights Commission did
not dismiss the petition and was willing to consider it is of significance in
permitting at least some access by individuals to an international body.
Perhaps of most significance is that the petition is a dramatic illustration
of the ability of private citizens to focus the attention of international
institutions upon the perpetration of a wrongful act by a sovereign state.
Kutner has again had occasion to file a petition for World Habeas
Corpus before the United Nations in the case of Moise Tshombe. Tshombe
had been a controversial figure as head of the secessionist province of Ka-
tanga and then as Premier of the Congo. Following a coup led by Joseph
D. Mobutu, he fled into exile, receiving asylum in Spain. While Tshombe
was in exile, the Mobutu regime tried him in absentia for high treason and
for the murder of former Congolese ruler Patrice Lumumba. Tshombe
was called upon to return for the trial but feared to leave his exile. He
was convicted and sentenced to be executed. Tshombe, while enjoying
asylum in Spain, boarded a British chartered plane for a flight to the
Spanish island of Majorca. During a stopover, certain individuals boarded
the plane and hijacked it to Algeria where Tshombe was arrested and
detained. Though the Congo did not have diplomatic relations nor any
treaty with Algeria, it sought his extradition. The Supreme Court of
Algeria found that Tshombe could be extradited. Kutner, on behalf of
Tshombe's wife, Madame Ruth Tshombe, filed a petition for Writ of
World Habeas Corpus with Algeria, the Congo, Spain and the United
Kingdom designated as respondents. Algeria was called upon to discharge
Tshombe from his arbitrary and illegal detention and from his being sub-
jected to extradition; Spain was to assert its sovereign right of enforcing
its granting of political asylum; and the United Kingdom was to protect
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him in the piracy of their overseas plane, chartered under British law and
guaranteeing him passage without unlawful interference by any other
sovereign state.
47
The petition alleges the facts surrounding Tshombe's kidnapping,
arrest and detention and "that the arbitrary arrest, kidnapping, and
detention in Algiers, Algeria, was the deliberate and planned act of the
respondent, the Congo, and pursuant to a conspiracy to deprive the
said Moise Tshombe of his human rights to be free from arbitrary arrest,
detention, and exile as guaranteed to him under the Articles of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. . . ." All the facts leading up to
the detention are stated with allegations that no defense counsel was
allowed at Tshombe's trial in the Congo, which was conducted with no
defense witnesses, without competent evidence and no record kept. The
trial was held in two sessions at eight-day intervals. As in the Oatis
petition, the Jurisdiction of the General Assembly is alleged by reference
to Charter provisions and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The Corollative Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice is also
alleged.
The petition also alleges that Algeria did not have jurisdiction to try
Tshombe, as none of the alleged crimes was committed within its jurisdic-
tion, nor did it have jurisdiction to extradite him to the Congo as he was
not legally brought or found within its jurisdiction and that Algeria, in
seeking to extradite him, is acting contrary to international custom and
practice. The petition further asserts that Tshombe did not engage in
any activities hostile to the state which may be classified as treason nor
engage in any acts contrary to the interests of the Congo, and that to have
the punishment of death run concurrently with alleged crimes is "to
make the demand for extradition a sham, pretense and a farce; and the
extradition ordered by the Algerian Supreme Court whs a transparent
comity arrangement and the compounding of international abduction."
The petition alleges that "it is a general rule of international law that
convictions par contumace (i.e., sentences imposed in absentia), are
treated as a nullity from the point of view of proceedings of extradition,"
and that in such cases "conclusive evidence of guilt has to be produced
before a surrender can be made." The trial and conviction of Tshombe
are characterized as "a transparent device" by Mobutu to tighten his
reins of dictatorship and to delude the United Nations, and that the
charges were without credence in fact or fiction, but simply the irre-
sponsible accusations of Mobutu.
The Petition alleges that Algeria and the Congo violated the concept
of human rights and international due process in that Tshombe was
denied a fair trial. The extradition proceedings in Algeria are alleged to
be a nullity in that there was no extradition treaty with the Congo and
47. The text of the Petition is presented in CONG. REc. S12417 (daily ed. Aug. 29, 1967).
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that, because Tshombe was denied the protection of international due
process, the extradition proceedings were void. The only available remedy
is alleged to be the Writ of World Habeas Corpus.
The allegations are buttressed by extensive scholarly argument sup-
porting contentions that a trial in absentia cannot support a conviction;
that the right to a fair trial is a recognized human right guaranteed by
international law; that Algeria would not be acting in accord with inter-
national legal principles if it extradited Tshombe to the Congo and
thereby aided and abetted in the kidnapping and had not followed any
procedures for determining the validity of the charges against him; that
Spain, after granting him asylum, was obliged to assure his protection
and that this protection extended to a plane on the high seas en route
from Majorca to the Spanish mainland with the right of asylum pro-
tected in international law by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and covenants, as well as by treaties affecting the rights of refugees; and
that the United Kingdom may also assert jurisdiction because the plane
was chartered under its laws. The argument then concludes with exten-
sive quotations as to the efficacy of the Writ of World Habeas Corpus.
The petition prays that the Human Rights Commission create an
Ad Hoc Committee Tribunal to accept the petition for the Writ of World
Habeas Corpus to inquire into the matter of Tshombe's detention and
imprisonment in Algeria, his trial and conviction in the Congo, the depri-
vation of political asylum in Spain, and the deprivation of the sovereignty
of the United Kingdom by the air piracy kidnapping of the British
plane." The petition further prays that the Commission forthwith issue
a United Nations Writ of World Habeas Corpus requiring Algeria to
show cause why the General Assembly should not order it to free
Tshombe.
Kutner, in the course of filing the petition, cabled President
Boumedienne to defer Tshombe's extradition pending a United Nations
determination of the matter and contacted State Department and United
Nations personnel along with representatives of the nations involved.
The Human Rights Commission accepted the petition, but has not yet
held a hearing. Though Kutner encountered some sympathetic response,
neither Spain nor the United Kingdom nor any other state has officially
intervened in the matter to press Tshombe's cause. According to Kutner,
the Algerian Mission to the United Nations has indicated to him that the
Algerian government is seeking a legal excuse to release Tshombe and
48. Professor William W. Bishop doubts whether a state is required today under cus-
tomary international law to accord the right of political asylum. [Letter to Kutner, August 3,
1967]. But a different position supporting Kutner, is taken by Weis. [Territorial Asylum, 6
INDIAN L.J. 173 (1966).] Generally, however, a state may not arbitrarily expel an alien.
[O'CONNFLL, INTERNAnONAL LAW 769 (1963).] However, perhaps as a result of the Tshombe
case, the United Nations adopted a resolution affirming the right to territorial asylum.
[Declaration of Territorial Asylum, U.N. Doc. 2313 (XII) A/RES/2313 (XXII), Decem-
ber 19, 1967.]
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that the petition provides it. The Algerian government has released the
plane, and Boumedienne has announced that Tshombe will not be extra-
dited. As of this writing, however, he still remains in detention.49 Kutner
believes his release is imminent.
There have been reports that, at one point, Boumedienne offered
to extradite Tshombe to the Congo in return for that country's severing
of its relations and contacts with Israel and aligning with Algeria's mil-
itant nationalist foreign policies; but Mobutu refused to agree, since he is
dependent upon United States and Israeli assistance. 0 There were also
charges that the kidnapping was perpetuated by agents of the Central
Intelligence Agency, an allegation which Kutner claims lacks any sub-
stance and is sheer nonsense.
Other reports assert that Tshombe was plotting a return to the
Congo and the overthrow of the Congo regime at the time of his kid-
napping.5' If this were true, he may have compromised his right to asylum
in Spain. But Kutner steadfastly denies these contentions. There has also
been publicized evidence, acknowledged by Kutner, that the kidnappers
had in fact been conspiring with Algerian authorities in arranging the
kidnapping. Some reports indicate that Mobutu is not eager to have
Tshombe return alive, as his presence might trigger an uprising in parts
of the Congo.52 The story is yet to unfold.
The Tshombe case represents a shocking disregard for international
legal principles. An individual, enjoying granted political asylum is, while
engaged in an international flight, suddenly seized and the plane is
hijacked. He is taken to another country (wherein he has never com-
mitted any criminal act) and imprisoned. To permit this action to stand
without protest by the international community would mean that no
person anywhere could be secure from kidnapping and other acts against
the person by agents of another state. The international legal order has
fallen upon a sorrowful state when protest may only be asserted by the
initiative of a private individual while the traditional subjects of inter-
national law stand mute. The petition has had the effect of focusing the
attention of international institutions upon what may be regarded as an
outrage to principles of international law.
In 1958, Representative John V. Beamer of Indiana introduced a
resolution5 3 proposing that the United States sponsor a multilateral
treaty creating an international tribunal as a forum for the assertion of a
prima facie case that an individual is being unlawfully detained by
governmental authorities and that the detention violates fundamental
human rights. The tribunal would be authorized to issue a Writ of Habeas
Corpus. Representatives of the State Department, in a letter to the House
49. Chicago Sun-Times, November 4, 1967, at 4.
50. Tshombe Issue Affects Mobutu's Rule, New York Times, August 12, 1967.
51. Violi, The Case of Moise Tshombe, Double Criss-Cross, ATLAS, Oct. 1967, at 38.
52. Id.
53. H.R. JOUR. 318, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
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Committee on Foreign Affairs, expressed opposition. 4 The objections
raised were that such a court was not practical, as there would not be an
enforcement system for compliance to its directives; that the proposed
tribunal would require an agreed code of international law which does
not exist at present; that with the many deep-seated political and ideo-
logical differences, it would not be "practical" to seek agreement on a
statute for such a court; and that "it is the settled policy of the Admin-
istration to favor methods other than treaties to encourage the interna-
tional promotion of human rights and individual freedoms."
Kutner replied to these arguments5 by contending that international
tribunals have traditionally secured compliance with their decisions
without the aid of specific enforcement procedures other than court
decrees, and that it would be unnecessary for the parties to the treaty
to formulate a legislative type code of law on arbitrary arrest and
confinement, since general obligations regarding individual rights may
be derived from procedures of mixed arbitral boards, as in the cases of
the rights of aliens, the bills of rights of constitutions and municipal
interpretation and the development of human rights principles by the
United Nations through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
establishing general standards of due process. Kutner further contends,
in replying to the State Department position, that there are many nations
who would agree to the proposal, and that no nation state which already
provides safeguards against arbitrary arrest should not logically oppose an
international guarantee. Finally, answering the State Department posi-
tion of opposing the promotion of human rights through treaties, Kutner
contends that respect for human rights can be molded only through
legal enforcement as embodied in World Habeas Corpus and that the
United States, as a "Big Power," is obliged to take the initiative.
Today the State Department position has been modified somewhat
in that three treaties involving human rights have been submitted to
the Senate for ratification: an amendment to an earlier treaty outlawing
slavery, a treaty dealing with the rights of women, and a treaty outlaw-
ing forced labor. These treaties were submitted because their adoption
would not involve constitutional questions. But only the first has been
ratified. Whether the Administration would now be inclined to support a
proposal for World Habeas Corpus is somewhat problematical, though
Ambassador Goldberg's support is indeed encouraging. Some study
may be needed as to whether American participation in a proposal for
World Habeas Corpus would accord with the Constitution regarding
federal-state relations. Inasmuch as the statute would be an overlay to
the federal habeas corpus, no constitutional conflict would be likely to
arise.
54. The text of the State Department position is found in WORLD HABEAS CORPUS, sUpra
note 9, at 154-55. ,
55. Kutner, The Case for an International Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Reply, 37 U. DET.
L. REv. 605 (1960). See also WORLD HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 9, ch. IX.
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A deplorable obstacle to American acceptance of a proposal for
World Habeas Corpus is the anachronistic outlook of some senators and
elected opinion-makers who still regard the protection of human rights
as a domestic or internal matter and not of concern to international
law or diplomacy and who have opposed the ratification of treaties on
this subject.56
Professor McDougal has commented:
It was appropriately urged by the late Judge Hersch Lauter-
pacht that until "an effective right of petition-which means a
right of petition with the right to have it investigated with the
view to such action being taken upon it as is necessary-is
granted to individuals concerned or to bodies acting on their
behalf, any international remedy that may be provided will be
deficient in its vital aspect." . . . For the larger community of
mankind genuinely aspiring toward improved implementation
of human rights the proposal for internationalizing habeas
corpus would appear to offer plausible hope for remedying the
greatest defect in its present armory of institutional practices.
Certainly the United States could have nothing to lose, save its
reputation for indifference to the human program, by vigorous
and positive action in exploration and promotion of the poten-
tialities that inhere in the [World] habeas corpus proposal."
[Footnotes omitted.]
Kutner has continued to express himself on various aspects of World
Habeas Corpus. In an address to the International Bar Association Con-
ference in Mexico City in 1964, representing the American Bar Associa-
tion, he suggested the use of World Habeas Corpus in maintaining inter-
national standards with regard to the extradition of individuals. 8 He has
also indicated how World Habeas Corpus may be applied to protect the
right to privacy and the family relationship.59 World Habeas Corpus
could be used to determine the right to child custody and to assure
freedom of movement from one nation to another of members of the
family unit. World Habeas Corpus may be adapted, as suggested by
Kutner, to another area of international law, the protection of prisoners
of war with the establishment of special tribunals to hear complaints,
through the invocation of Writs of World Habeas Corpus, of violations
of the Geneva Conventions.6 °
Kutner has suggested the adaptation of remedies analogous to World
56. See, e.g., CONG. REc. E755 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 1968).
57. M. McDougal, International Habeas Corpus: A Practicable Measure for Human
Rights (unpubl. paper).
58. Kutner, World Habeas Corpus and International Extradition, 41 U. DET. L.J. 525
(1964).
59. Kutner, Due Process of Family Privacy: World Civil Liberty and World Habeas
Corpus, 28 U. PirT. L. REv. 597 (1967).
60. Kutner, 'International' Due Process for Prisoners of War: The Need for a Special
Tribunal of World Habeas Corpus, 21 U. MrA.mi L. REv. 721 (1967).
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Habeas Corpus, such as Habeas Proprietatem, as a means for obtaining
compensation through an international tribunal of seized foreign prop-
erty.6 He has also formulated a scheme for the protection of individual
rights to the use of the sea and sea floor through a writ of Habeas Marinus
which would allow recourse to an international tribunal when such rights
are infringed upon.62 Habeas Marinus would be particularly applicable
to the exploitation of the resources underneath the sea, including the sea
floor, in inner space. Kutner has also proposed the establishment of an
International Cosmos Court to regulate the use of outer space. 3
His main focus, however, has been upon the proposal for World
Habeas Corpus to which he has dedicated himself with religious and
evangelistic fervor. Kutner reaffirms that "World Habeas Corpus is
• ..on the threshhold of becoming an accomplished fact, a long-time
movement, a tenacious dream, that has a good chance of coming true."64
II. THE PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL
To Kutner, the international community has degenerated to atavism,
as characterized by the conflict in Viet Nam and, recently, by the Arab-
Israeli war, in which the Arab states had proclaimed the political annihila-
tion of Israel and the genocide of its people as their goal. Particularly
appalling were the cynical policies of the big powers in the Middle East.
The acts of genocide by the Chinese in Tibet and of Nigeria in Biafra are
also indicative of an atavistic trend. Kutner believes that the establish-
ment of an international war crimes tribunal is needed for the impartial
adjudication of such international outrages. The precedent is to be found
in the Nuremberg Trials following World War II.65 Kutner envisions
such a court as holding both states and individuals responsible for ac-
tions which may constitute war crimes under the criteria of the Nuremberg
Charter, the United Nations Charter, the Genocide Convention, and other
international conventions, declarations and treaties. It would provide
a means for impartial adjudication of such international actions as the
American intervention in Viet Nam. The effect would be to focus the
spotlight of world public opinion upon the condemnation of actions
constituting war crimes. Persecuted groups would have access to an
international body for a hearing.
61. Kutner, Habeas Proprietatem: Due Process for International Investments: A Prior
Consideration for Investments Abroad, 40 U. DET. L.J. 617 (1963). Kutner, Habeas Pro-
prietatem: An International Remedy for Wrongful Seizures of Property, 38 U. DET. L.J. 419
(1961).
62. Kutner, Due Process of Inner Space, Habeas Marinus: A Proposal, 22 U. MIAMi L.
REV. 629 (1968).
63. Kutner & Raab, Due Process of Outer Space Law: The International Cosmos Court:
A Proposal, 39 U. DET. L.J. 685 (1962).
64. L. KUTNER, I, THE LAWYER 105 (1966).
65. Kutner, Due Process of War: An Ad Hoc War Crimes Tribunal: A Proposal, 43
NOTRE DAME LAW. 481 (1968).
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The proposal has its antecedents in a draft treaty of the Interna-
tional Law Commission in the early 1950's.66 One objection that has
been raised is the absence of a jury. However, international standards
have recognized that a fair trial may be held without a jury. 7
Another problem is to develop criteria for determining criminal
responsibility. If responsibility is to extend beyond the heads of state,
and superior orders is not to be a defense, then could acquiescence in
the perpetration of a criminal act, or inaction to stop the action, be
regarded as criminal? For example, if Nazis, who obeyed orders in tortur-
ing and killing concentration camp inmates are to be held responsible,
what about the American leaders who were indifferent or hindered efforts
to save Europe's Jews? Should they be indicted for a criminal act?
Similarly, where is responsibility to be assessed in Viet Nam? Atrocities
have been committed by both sides. Are the heads of state of both North
Viet Nam and South Viet Nam responsible, along with the leaders of the
American administration? Is the Russian Government and the Chinese
Communist Regime also responsible?
Kutner is aware that compelling though fictitious argument against
the proposal is that it may make negotiation, and the reconciliation of
international conflicts, more difficult. When one side to a conflict is
branded a criminal, it becomes more difficult to deal with. But the
substantive value of the proposal is not impaired. American foreign
policy, particularly, has tended to be moralistic as distinguished from
moral.6 Thus, to some Americans any negotiation or compromise with
an adversary labeled "evil" is denounced, such as negotiation with the
Soviet Union, or to attempt a compromise solution in Viet Nam is con-
ceived to be appeasement. Similarly, contacts with the Chinese Communist
Regime are to be abhorred.
The international situation as a whole in a total context must be
considered in dealing with other nations. Though there may be evil in
Communist domination of the nations of Eastern Europe, resort to
nuclear war for their liberation would constitute a much greater evil.
The demands of international diplomacy require dealings and alliances
with states regardless of the nature of their government or their past
acts. For example, after World War II the Franco Regime in Spain was
condemned for its association with the Axis powers and the United
Nations called upon all states to sever diplomatic relations with it. The
Spanish Regime was little affected by such action, and, subsequently,
because of the needs of the cold war, Spain was permitted to return as
66. Parker, An International Criminal Court: The Case for Its Adoption, 38 A.B.A.J.
641 (1952); Finch, An International Criminal Court: The Case against Its Adoption, 38
A.B.A.J. 644 (1952).
67. Harris, The Right to a Fair Trial in Criminal Proceedings as a Human Right, 16
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 352 (1967).
68. Kaplan, Ethics of American Policy, in MORRISON, ESSAYS iN AmERICAN STYLE 5
(1958).
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a respected member of the family of nations and is now a member of the
United Nations. 9
Kutner suggests sanctions flowing from a treaty-statute to overcome
the problem of the enforcement of a War Crimes Court decree. Such a
decree would differ from that of any other international tribunal in brand-
ing a state or an individual. Therefore, voluntary compliance is unlikely
to be forthcoming. Though the force of public opinion may be a factor,
it is of limited effect. The widespread condemnation of the suppression
of the Hungarian Revolution was of little effect upon either the Soviet
Union or the Kador Regimes which are fully accepted within the family
of nations enjoying full diplomatic relations with the United States.
Another case has been the United Nations condemnation of Apartheid
policies in the Union of South Africa and its policies with respect to
Southwest Africa. This has had little effect in causing South Africa to
change its policies, while overriding security and economic considera-
tions have compelled members of the international community to continue
their dealings with South Africa. The international condemnation of a
nation may even have an opposite effect from that which was intended
in actually strengthening the regime in power. The citizens of the nation
may feel that their national pride has been challenged and rally to its
defense, as was the case in Spain.
The imposition of meaningful economic, fiscal, technical aid, refugee
and UNESCO sanctions, assuming that it would be possible to get around
or overcome the problem of a big power veto in the Security Council,
would no longer be effective, as demonstrated by the League of Nations'
experience in imposing sanctions upon Italy after it had invaded Ethiopia
in the 1930's and the current boycott of Rhodesia. To use military force
may also be unwise with the absence of an international police force.
Moreover, where a big power is involved, as was the case in Hungary,
such military intervention may ignite a wider war or further inflame the
conflict, thereby causing an even greater evil.
Clearly, the proposal for an International War Crimes Tribunal
is not a venture into futility. Kutner is willing to seek first the institution
of a radical change in the international order. Such a tribunal would be
effective in a world order where war itself as an instrument of interna-
tional policy was abolished through a scheme for total and complete
disarmament to be achieved through international agreement or by uni-
lateral initiatives. The sovereignty of the nation state would then be
subordinated to an overriding world authority. This is what Kutner
envisions, and he is as explicit as one could be in the light of the medioc-
rity of international decision-makers.
Kutner's proposal for a War Crimes Tribunal, like his proposal for
World Habeas Corpus, is in the American tradition of perceiving an evil
and seeking a legal solution to resolve it. It is a part of the American heri-
69. See generally CROZIER, GENERALIssIMo FRANCO (1968).
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tage to conceive plans for world order-to strive for the desirable-re-
gardless of international realities. Kutner is very much a part of that
tradition. Opposed to this outlook are self-styled, hard-headed realists
who conceive of international relations essentially in terms of achieving
objectives through the exercise of power politics. They dismiss the
schemes of the idealists out of hand as visionary, as demonstrated by the
State Department reaction to the proposal for World Habeas Corpus.
Occasionally, an idealist will find reason to despair and to resign himself
to cynicism. The writer recalls a meeting he had with a noted jurist who,
after encountering such frustration in representing his country on the
Human Rights Commission that he lost all hope for achieving world
order and has now focused his scholarly attention on ancient and medieval
history.
Both the idealist and the realist perform a valuable service. In a
world of universal interdependence and the overhanging threat of thermo-
nuclear annihilation, a radical alteration of the international order has
become imperative. The suggestions of visionaries like Luis Kutner are
needed in an attempt to devise means for implementing international
change. To accept totally the outlook of the realists is to become resigned
to a Hobbesian jungle of war of one against all. Nevertheless the realist
is needed to provide critical reflection to the visions of the idealists.
Both the realist and the idealist have important roles to play.
III. KUTNER THE REFORMER
Aside from concern about improving international institutions,
Kutner has also focused his attention on matters of domestic legal re-
form, particularly in the areas of mental health, charitable trusts, victims
of crime, industrial relations, and the publicity of criminal proceedings.
His contributions to these areas of law will be discussed briefly.
A. Mental Health-Commitment Proceedings
Kutner's concern with the rights of persons who are involuntarily
committed to mental hospitals was first manifested in his efforts to obtain
the release of the noted American poet, Ezra Pound, from Saint Eliza-
beth's Hospital where he had been committed subsequent to government
accusations that he had acted treasonably during World War II by
broadcasting and disseminating Axis propaganda from Italy. Kutner's
interest in the case stemmed from his association with Ellen Borden
Stevenson (the divorced wife of Adlai Stevenson, who had been associated
with writers and artists) and his friendship with Ernest Hemingway.
Kutner recommended and also contacted Thurman Arnold and Abe
Fortas, who initiated a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus to obtain
Pound's release.
Kutner continued to manifest concern for the protection of the
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rights of individuals who are committed to mental hospitals. An article
which was published in the Northwestern Law Review in 196270 along
with an expos6 in the Chicago Daily News contributed to the rewriting of
the Illinois Statute. The article was chosen in a collection of readings
on the topic for use as a college text.7'
Kutner castigated the procedures in the United States for committing
the mentally ill as "sick, obsolescent and unjust."72 These procedures
were characterized as "illusions of due process."7" Though the Illinois
statute provided elaborate procedures for commitment, in actual practice
the statutory requirements were evaded. The Illinois system then pro-
vided that for an individual to be committed a petition be signed by a
friend or relative of the alleged mentally ill, stating that the petitioner
knows the person for whom confinement is sought and believes him to
be mentally ill; an examination by one or more court-appointed
doctors who will prepare diagnosis and submit it to the court; and a
court hearing at which the alleged mentally ill is entitled to demand a
jury. However, in practice, as undertaken by the Cook County Mental
Health Clinic, the physician's certificates were signed as a matter of course
by staff physicians with little or no examination and after the alleged
mentally ill had already been brought in for confinement. The same
staff doctor was later appointed to handle the examination for the
court. Examinations were conducted on an assembly-line basis, often
taking only a few minutes. At the court hearings the patients were kept
under heavy sedation and were often stuperous. The clinic followed the
practice of not informing patients of their right to counsel. This is a
problem not peculiar to Illinois.
Kutner noted that, while the legal profession is concerned with
procedures to protect individuals from being "railroaded" to mental
institutions, the medical profession is rightly concerned that excessive
legal formality may do harm to the patient. The problem involves both
medicine and law. Kutner would agree with the medical profession in
eliminating the use of jury trials, whether mandatory or optional, from
commitment proceedings. He would also eliminate the trappings of crim-
inal proceedings by rewriting the statutes to eliminate terminology em-
ployed in criminal actions, removing the police from the commitment
proceedings in all but the most violent cases, and replacing formal court
hearings with informal hearings before commissions as in Britain. In-
voluntary commitment, to Kutner, is justifiable as part of the police
power, to protect the remainder of society, and parens patriae: care for
the incompetent and protection of the individual from himself.
However, Kutner proposed that the requirement of notice be re-
70. Kutner, The Illusion of Due Process in Commitment Proceedings, 57 Nw. U.L. REV.
383 (1962).
71. READINGS IN MENTAL ILLNESS AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS 89 (1966).
72. Kutner, supra note 70, at 383.
73. Id,
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tained, despite the objections of psychiatrists. The notice requirement
allows the individual to prepare and present his defense. The notice need
not be formally served by a sheriff, but informally by a social worker.
Kutner would permit the presence of the individual at the hearings but
not require it. Thus, he clearly disagrees with the urgings of some
psychiatrists that they be empowered to summarily commit individuals.
He strongly opposes the practice of summary commitment with an
appeal procedure. Kutner urged the adoption of uniform legislation with
a minimum requirement of due process, "that every man is entitled to a
fair hearing, on notice, should he be threatened with confinement."
Influenced by Kutner's article, Illinois, and thirty-two other states
have revised their commitment procedures, all in line with Kutner's sug-
gestions. The present Illinois statute follows the Kutner recommendations
in providing for informal notice and for a hearing by a commission,
though the individual may elect to have a jury hearing. 74 The statute also
provides that the individual who is confined has a right to counsel and
to be informed of this right. If the proceedings do result in his commit-
ment, he may be brought to the institution by private automobile or by
a relative. Provision is also made for periodic review every sixty days
as to his detention.
Since the appearance of Kutner's article, national concern has also
been expressed regarding the power of the courts, on the determination
of a psychiatrist, to determine whether an individual is competent to
stand trial and to achieve thereby his detention without judicial pro-
cedures. Case histories pointing to abuses in this regard have been
recently highlighted in a book by the noted psychiatrist, Thomas S.
Szasz, 5 who refers to Kutner's article. Recently, the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia has granted a habeas corpus
petition to an individual confined to a public institution after pleading
innocent to a criminal charge by reason of insanity because he was not
receiving adequate treatment.7 6 It is submitted that this principle should
be extended to all persons who are involuntarily committed. Clearly, the
concern for protecting the mentally ill's rights should extend beyond his
commitment.7 7 Moreover, he should not be subjected to surgery, electro-
shock therapy, insulin treatment or other radical treatment without his
express consent. He should also have the right to receive visitors where
this right does not conflict with his treatment. Regulations prohibiting
visitation on Sundays, the only day a family member may be able to come
to the state hospital, should be regarded as an arbitrary infringement
of this right. In another area regarding the rights of the mentally ill,
74. ILL. REV. STATS. ch. 91-1/2 (1967).
75. T. SZASZ, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE (1966).
76. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
77. Note, 42 TuLANE L. REV. 407 (1968) ; Comment, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and
the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967).
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concern has been expressed as to the constitutionality of statutes pro-
viding for the compulsory commitment of drug addicts."8
Kutner believes that a paramount question for consideration is
whether individuals should be involuntarily committed. Kutner urges that
a thorough study be made of the premises justifying such commitment.
There may be justification, where an individual would be a threat to
others, but not as to harmless individuals. Kutner resists and objects to
the temptation to commit persons merely because they do not conform to
the behavioral norms established by society.
B. Charitable Trusts
Kutner's interest in charitable trusts developed as a result of his
involvement as counsel for the Artists Equity of the City of Chicago in
the case of the Ferguson Monument Trust, which revealed the shocking
inadequacies of legal protection of charitable trusts in Illinois.7" Mr.
Benjamin F. Ferguson, upon his death in 1905, left all of his one million
dollar estate in trust to be permanently used for beautifying the City of
Chicago through the erection of statuary and artistic monuments with
the trust instrument designating the Northern Trust Company as trustee
and the Art Institute of Chicago designated to expend the money under
the direction of its Board of Trustees "in the erection and maintenance of
enduring statuary monuments ... ." The gift was hailed at the time as a
great gift to the City of Chicago in making the city beautiful. The City
and its people were to be the true beneficiaries. The Art Institute chan-
neled the fund for the erection of several monuments. But after 1929 no
more statutes were erected. The Art Institute, eager to obtain funds for
its own expansion, in 1933 filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court of Cook
County requesting the court to construe the language of the will so that
the word monument might include a building, specifically an addition
to the Art Institute. The Attorney General filed an answer making only
a nominal defense, and a decree was entered. The Art Institute's Com-
plaint, the Attorney General's Answer, and the court's decree were all
typed on the same typewriter, bore the same watermark, and the Attorney
General's Answer was enclosed in the same reversed blue backing of
the Art Institute's counsel, who was himself a member of its Board. No
witnesses were heard and no transcript of any proceedings appears in the
court's files. Where the Art Institute had been the administrator of the
Fund, it had now become its beneficiary. Because the Art Institute decided
to postpone construction of an addition until a substantial fund had
accumulated, the public became aware of the loss only gradually. Several
civic groups' requests for assistance in erecting new sculptures were
denied in the 1930's and the 1940's.
78. Lowenstein, Addiction, Insanity, and Due Process of Law: An Examination of the
Capacity Defense, 3 HARV. CivIL RIGHTs-CIvn. LIBERTTES L. REV. 125 (1967).
79. Kutner, The Desecration of the Ferguson Monument Trust: The Need for Watchdog
Legislation, 12 DE PAUL L. REV. 217 (1963).
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By 1955, $1,600,000 had accumulated, and the Art Institute decided
to proceed with the construction of the addition. Since the 1933 decree
had sanctioned a museum building, and it had been decided to construct
an office building in a slightly different location, it was deemed prudent
again to obtain court affirmance. But the public was now aware of the
Art Institute's scheme; and several parties, including the City of
Chicago, requested the then Attorney General to enter a vigorous defense
to the Art Institute's petition. However, the then Attorney General,
whose relative was on the women's board of the Art Institute, publicly
declined to resist the Art Institute's petition, stating that he felt himself
bound by the earlier decision. After several groups' petitions to intervene
were denied, the Circuit Court of Cook County decreed that, as requested
by the Art Institute, the income from the Ferguson Fund could be
perpetually used for the construction and maintenance of the Art Insti-
tute's administrative wing. Subsequent suits foundered on the same point.
The perversion of the Ferguson Monument Fund was complete, in the
writer's opinion, with the premeditated fraud given judicial sanction.
Kutner noted that the case pointed up flaws in the charitable trust
statute. Illinois courts have great leeway in reconstructing the terms of
a charitable trust instrument. The courts' interpretation of "enduring
monument" is questioned by Kutner in the light of contemporary under-
standing of the meaning of that term. Under Illinois law only the Attorney
General could act on behalf of the beneficiary."0 When the Attorney
General chose not to enforce the terms of the trust, no remedy existed.
Kutner's participation in this case led to his appointment as special
Assistant Attorney General to draft a new statute. But he regards the
act in its final form as having failed to provide the safeguards revealed
necessary by the Ferguson case. To Kutner an effective charitable trust
law must require registration with a designated state officer, trustees
must be required to submit regular reports of the financial activity of all
charitable trusts, there must be effective enforcement provisions, and
the beneficiaries must have standing to sue.
Kutner regards the present Illinois Act 8 as effectively meeting the
registration requirement by providing for registration by the trustee of
the trust instrument and powers with the Attorney General. However,
this provision does not apply to religious groups nor to trusts operated
for education or hospital purposes. Illinois is unique in providing for
a minimum size of trusts covered by the Act.
The Illinois Act also provides for the filing of annual reports, but
banks and trust companies are excepted, which emasculates the Act.
Kutner contends that ordinary state and federal supervision of banking
institutions offers little protection. The statute also failed to permit
80. People ex rel. Courtney v. Wilson, 327 Ill. App. 231, 163 N.E.2d 794 (1945).
81. ILL. STAT., VOL. II, CHARITABLE TRUST ACT (1961).
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beneficiaries to have standing. Kutner believes that despite the new
statute, the same kind of fraud, as was perpetrated in the Ferguson Case,
is still possible. However, at the initiative of a new Attorney General,
the directors of the Art Institute, through their attorneys, announced
that the accumulated income from the principal of the Ferguson Monu-
ment Fund of $1,000,000 would be used to erect statuary in the City of
Chicago, demonstrating that even the weak 1961 Act can be effective in
the hands of conscientious public servants.
Kutner would amend the Illinois Charitable Trusts Act to provide
that trustees failing to register to file periodic written reports be sub-
ject to a fine of not less than $500 nor more than $10,000, or a prison
term of not more than one year. He would also provide similar penal
sanctions for a trustee who is found to have intentionally and materially
violated his beneficiary responsibility to the intended beneficiaries of
the trust. Kutner would also allow for a suit to be brought in the name of
the state to secure the proper administration of the trust by any ten or
more interested parties, a donor to the trust, or a member or prospective
member of the class for the benefits of whom the trust was established.
As to why he would require "ten persons" in order to bring suit is to
suggest that in numbers one can dilute the possibility of corruption.
Kutner's suggestion as to standing for trust enforcement has in-
spired a Wisconsin statute, 2 while his recommendations for imposing
penalties upon trustees appear to have inspired an Ohio statute.8 3 He has
surveyed the statutes of other states, contending attorneys must be
aware of their content in drafting a trust instrument.84 Kutner, however,
deliberately does not discuss the role of the Federal Government in
administering charitable trusts through the Internal Revenue Statute
which could be amended to supplement state administration. The issues
in that forum are drastically different.
C. Crime-Torts
In a scholarly article,8" Kutner has argued for the establishment of
the right of victims of criminal acts to bring civil action for compensation.
He coined the term crime-tort, the liability of a governmental unit for
failure to protect its citizens. He noted the tendency of recent decisions
to sweep away the doctrine of sovereign immunity. For example the case
of Schuster v. New York8" recognized the obligation of state authority to
exercise special care in the protection of persons who have assisted as
informers in leading to the prosecution of criminals. Kutner argues for
82. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 231.34(1) (1963).
83. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.99 (Baldwin 1964).
84. Kutner & Koven, Charitable Trust Legislation in the Several States, 61 Nw. U.L.
REv. 411 (1966).
85. Kutner, Crime-Torts: Due Process of Compensation for Crime Victims, 44 NOTRE
DAmE LAW. 487 (1966).
86. 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958).
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an extension of the Schuster doctrine for the protection of all citizens. To
Kutner such an action would partake partially of the nature of an action
for breach of contract and partly as an action for tort. An implied con-
tract is suggested in the fact that the individual pays taxes, which is to
be regarded as consideration for which the government in return provides
means for the general welfare, including police and fire protection. When
the governmental unit fails in its consideration so that a taxpayer or
third-party beneficiary is injured, there is a breach of contractual duty.
The injuries arising from inadequate police protection are reasonably
foreseeable and, therefore, should be compensable. Another quid pro quo
aspect is that the individual's right to self-defense and self-protection
has been limited by laws outlawing the right to carry concealed weapons
while police are given greater authority to make arrests.
The tort involved is that implicit in crime and violence, especially in
high crime rate districts, is the element of negligence. The tort would also
be predicated on the right of an individual to be free from criminal acts.
In addition, recent developments in the area of strict liability may be
applicable. Present day urban civilization should be regarded as an enter-
prise wherein all who benefit should assume the risk of increased liability.
Kutner notes legislation for compensating victims of crime in New Zea-
land, Britain and California and focuses upon the proposal of Senator
Yarborough and Representative Green for compensation at the federal
level." However, his preference is for compensation through judicial
proceedings.
This author's objection to the administration compensation plan
is that it precludes the basic premise of the system of torts to
compensate the victims of accidents for the loss sustained.
The money damages award for injuries suffered by the victim
of a crime properly belongs within the province of courts and
juries. Furthermore, there would be no limit to damages. It has
been argued that litigation in ordinary courts results in undue
delay and expense as well as in the necessity of contending with
burdensome technicalities of proof. The argument has some
conceded validity but it is submitted that there are countervail-
ing arguments which outweigh these considerations.
A commission that sits in session and hears a large number of
cases will soon lose its perspective and false and improper stan-
dards may be established. As the volume of cases increases, so
will institutionalization. Another problem in the proposed fed-
eral bills is the limitation upon compensation for attorneys. This
could well limit the enthusiasm of the bar in representing crime
victims. This limitation when viewed together with the institu-
tionalized processes of a commission could prevent the plan from
accomplishing its end. The fresh view of ever-changing juries
87. The proposed bills are set forth at 41 NoTRE DAME LAW. 501 (1966).
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can preserve the integrity of adequate compensation for victims
of crimes, that is, remedy in direct proportion to the wrong.88
Kutner's urging that redress for crime-torts be obtained through
civil actions in judicial proceedings with determinations of awards by
juries is original. The compensation for victims of criminal acts essen-
tially embodies social legislation8" similar to workmen's compensation,
a point Kutner himself concedes when he argues for strict liability on
the enterprise theory. Apparently, he would not account for contributory
negligence. Obviously, no one would contribute to self-inflicted crime
violence. Therefore, the only determination the jury would make is for
the amount of compensation. Whether jurors, who are likely to be tax-
payers, would be sympathetic in setting compensation could open a new
segment of compensatory and punitive damages.
Furthermore, as has been the experience in other tort actions-
particularly regarding automobile injuries, the right of recovery has been
thwarted by crowded court calendars. Because of this very problem, pro-
posals have been made to substitute other institutional remedies in auto
collision cases.90 Kutner is not required to present any empirical evidence
that a commission which would hear a large number of cases ".... will soon
lose its perspective and false and improper standards may be established."
Such commissions have functioned with regard to workmen's compensa-
tion. Where a commission or administrative agency should depart from
established standards, there would be the check of judicial review. More-
over, a scheme could be devised where a victim of a crime-tort could
have the option of instituting a civil action in a court of law or of seeking
recompense from a commission. As to concern for attorneys' fees, this
would be met by more liberal statutory limitations. Fee limitations in
workmen's compensation statutes have not apparently discouraged attor-
neys from litigating these cases. Conceivably, provision could be made for
the state to retain special attorneys to represent crime-tort victims.
Kutner, apparently, would permit compensation for all crimes re-
gardless of where committed. But should the victim of a crime be entitled
to compensation when he has invited the perpetrator of the act onto his
property or has entered the perpetrator's property? Should an automobile
driver who becomes the victim of a hitchhiker, despite police warnings,
be entitled to compensation? What are the rights of a victim who conspic-
uously carries a large sum of money or a valuable object on a deserted
street? Should a scantily clad female who walks in a deserted area
frequented by burly males and becomes the victim of sexual molestation
be permitted to recover from the governmental unit? What if an individ-
ual leaves a valuable object unattended and easily accessible to any in-
88. Kutner, supra note 85, at 501.
89. Comment, Compensation to Victims of Violent Crimes, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 72 (1966).
90. Walker, The Gathering Storm in Automobile Injury Compensation: A Workable
Solution, 22 U. MiAi L. REv. 151 (1967).
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truder? What of an auto theft where the manufacturer fails to provide
an adequate locking device? Clearly, many problems are involved in
developing the applications of the law of crime-torts. Kutner rejects
these speculations. He submits that the act of crime-tort is res ipsa
loquitur.
D. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
One of Kutner's major interest areas has long been labor-manage-
ment relations.91 In this area, Kutner suggests clinical psychiatry and
the restructuring of the industrial system.
Shortly before his death in 1963, Senator Estes Kefauver had
planned, through his chairmanship of the Senate Anti-Monopoly Sub-
committee, to initiate an investigation of labor unions as a monopoly
force in the economy and its exemption from federal antitrust prosecution.
Kutner was one of his original advisors in the creation of the Kefauver
Crime Committee of 1949 and was to be his associate in this investiga-
tion. 2 The blueprint for this investigation was to have been a law review
article by Kutner.93 He questions the need for the continued "special
privileges and immunities" conferred by Congress upon unions, including
the exemption from income taxes and freedom from federal antitrust
prosecution, alleging that under this umbrella of congressional protection
unions have achieved disproportionate power, wealth, and economic
dominance. He claims "the public welfare is threatened today by the
fact that the nation's economy is to a large extent controlled by that ten
per cent of the population who comprise the labor union force."94 He
proposes the following program:9 5
I. Labor union immunity from antitrust prosecution in those
activities which are essentially directed toward control of
the product market should be abrogated. More specifically,
legislation should outlaw direct union attempts to: (a)
control prices, (b) control areas of product distribution,
(c) control the amount of goods produced, and (d) con-
trol the number of firms which may engage in the produc-
tion and distribution of goods.
II. Industry-wide negotiation should be made illegal, with
limitations imposed on the size of collective bargaining
units. The least ambiguous size boundary would be that of
the enterprise or employer-generously construed. It
should be further provided that collusion between manage-
91. See, e.g., Kutner, Minimizing Personality Tensions in Industrial Relations, 9 BOSTON
U. Bus. REV. 29 (1963).
92. Bartlett, Hear Kefauver, Chicago Lawyer Planned Union Probe, Chicago Sun-Times,
Aug. 18, 1963, at 7.
93. Kutner, Due Process of Economy: Antitrust Control of Labor, 24 U. PITT. L. REV.
1 (1962).
94. Id. at 2.
95. Id.
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ment or union bargaining units would be illegal, as would
also be financial assistance of one unit by another.
III. Present labor union exemption from the federal income
tax should be removed.
Kutner contends that, while union antitrust exemption under the
Clayton, Norris-LaGuardia and Wagner Acts was justified when the
position of unions was weak and ineffectual, this exemption is now "an-
tiquated" because unions now negotiate from a position of great strength.
He distinguishes problems involving the relationship between the union
and its members from those involving the relationship of the union as a
whole and the remainder of society and that present labor legislation is
unsuited for the latter and that the antitrust laws might be applicable.
Involved is the increasing tendency for unions to ignore the general
welfare in engaging in strikes and the growth of union wealth which is
being used as a weapon of economic coercion. A small union may use a
strike as a weapon against a large segment of society, such as occurred
in the New York dock strike of 1961 and other instances of industry-wide
shutdowns paralyzing major sectors of the economy.
Regarding financial power, Kutner contends that the AFL-CIO
has direct and indirect control over funds as great as three billion dollars
and an estimated annual income of six hundred twenty million dollars.
"The really remarkable thing about the great wealth of American Labor
Unions is not the wealth itself, but the fact that union funds represent
the greatest source of capital in this country totally free of governmental
control," and that "short of larceny, union leaders are in no way legally
inhibited in their use of the vast sums at their disposal.""6 In one in-
stance, as referred to by Kutner, involving the United Hatter's Union, the
union bought a controlling interest in a company producing felt bodies
and forced the millinery firms employing union members to buy their felt
bodies from it. Furthermore, combined financial resources may be
pooled as strike funds, thereby creating an overpowering position with
regard to the small employer. Kutner, therefore, contends that unions
should be made responsible for their income. In his approach Kutner
produces a drawing line between licit and illicit union activity.
It is suggested that the dichotomy should be between union
activities in the labor markets on one hand, and in the product
market on the other. Activities in the labor market (e.g., control
of the number of workers, their wages and their working condi-
tions) have always been the heart of any union program, if not
union raison d'tre. Union excursions into the product market
are relative afterthoughts, and are hardly essential to the
union's cause. While it can be argued, therefore, that because of
their very nature unions should be allowed to restrain trade or
monopolize in the labor market, there is no reason to allow
96. Id. at 13.
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unions the same breadth of activity in the product market. In-
deed, neither the fundamental nature nor honest effectiveness
of unions would be damaged by simply requiring unions to re-
strict their activities to the labor market only. This is precisely
the conclusion that was reached by the Attorney General's Com-
mittee to Study the Antitrust Laws when it recommended that
market control and other restrictive union practices which are
not legitimate union objectives to be made unlawful.
Kutner, therefore, proposes to remove antitrust immunity in the
product market as affecting attempts to control prices, areas of product
distribution, the amount of goods produced, and the number of firms
which may engage in the production and distribution of goods. The
unions would remain immune from prosecution as affecting legitimate
collective bargaining activities. The possibility of crippling nation-wide
strikes would be minimized, according to Kutner, by making industry-
wide negotiation illegal. Gifts of strike funds between unions would be
made illegal. The unions' investment income, as distinguished from
union dues, would no longer be exempted from income taxation.
Kutner would combine these enactments with his proposal for the
establishment of an "Economy Court" before which would be settled any
labor dispute in which the public had a vital stake.98 He would apply
the concepts of "due process of law" to labor relations or what he labels
as "Due Process of Economy." Kutner envisages such a court as pro-
tecting the public interest by permitting free collective bargaining within
the framework of judicial economic standards. He envisages such a court
as comprised of three judges sitting en banc who would be trained as
economists with the public interest to be represented by a special Assis-
tant Attorney General from the Department of Labor. Either side to a
labor dispute could initiate a complaint. The proposed court would have
summary power to issue decrees enjoining action. Where no agreement
was reached within six months after termination of a collective bargaining
contract, the parties would appear before the court for a judicial deter-
mination. Decisions would bind both parties. The court would protect
either weak unions or weak employers from economic muscle power.
This court would also apply principles of fairness to such matters as job
security resulting from automation.
Kutner's proposals have received international interest of prominent
industrialists, corporations, and members of Congress who have formed
a committee to study them and to draft proposed legislation. However,
these proposals are highly controversial, though the need may exist for
new legislation in the area of industrial relations.
The proposal for an Economy Court really envisions the establish-
97. Id. at 15.
98. Kutner, Due Process of Economy: A Proposal for a United States Economy Court,
15 U. MIAMI L. REV. 341 (1961).
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ment of an administrative agency or what may be called a legislative, as
distinguished from a constitutional, court. Kutner, however, attempts
to distinguish such a court from an administrative agency by its power
to issue summary decrees. The proposal calls for the establishment of a
"court" in each judicial circuit, and envisions the establishment of uni-
form standards of due process of economy. The development of mecha-
nisms to reconcile differences between the "courts" of each circuit would
develop by case precedent. He deliberately leaves open the question of
how the judges are to be selected (whether as representatives of labor
and management or by the President) and as to whether they are to have
life tenure, a fixed term like the members of the National Labor Relations
Board or to serve at the pleasure of the President. This should be a
matter of legislative consensus. Provisions for review are also left open
suggesting finality of a court ruling. These are matters of primary con-
sideration in formulating such a proposal, and the flexibility of Kutner's
proposal is its great strength of realism.
A fundamental problem and asset in Kutner's proposal is the open
definition of what is meant by the public interest, involving philosophical
considerations. American society is composed of diverse and competing
interest groups, and public policy is made through a political process
which entails the reconciling of these competing interests. Therefore,
the proposed Economy Court would necessarily be a political institution.
Its conception of the public interest would be subjective. Though it is
true that even the constitutional courts are to an extent political in that
subjective decision-making is involved, this proposed court would have
even broader powers and exercise an even greater prerogative. The nature
of a dynamic economy is such that it could not adhere to precedent or
principles of stare decisis. The course of the American economy would be
vested in the hands of a three-man court. Kutner's rhetoric of free enter-
prise contemplates and suggests a fundamental change in the collective
bargaining process and in the organization of the economy. A party to
a labor dispute which would feel it could benefit from a favorable Economy
Court decision would purposefully deadlock negotiations to induce com-
pulsory arbitration. Clearly, the court would have immense power over
the economy. Since Kutner is indeed advocating a radical reorganization
of the economic decision process, he provokes and challenges the Congress
to legislative adulthood.
For emphasis, Kutner somewhat exaggerates the economic power
of labor unions. By his own figures the total annual income of all unions
is over six hundred million dollars annually. But such giant corporations
as General Motors, Standard Oil of New Jersey, and American Telephone
and Telegraph have annual profits which are more than double this
total. Clearly, the economic impact of industry upon the economy far
exceeds that of organized labor. But this argument does not diminish
Kutners' proposal.
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Kutner's proposals to apply the antitrust laws to certain labor union
activities merit consideration to eliminate certain abuses. But his pro-
posal to forbid industry-wide bargaining is startling, especially withIregard to such oligopolistic industries as steel where one or two
companies are dominant and set pricing policies for the entire industry.
In some instances if a union were compelled to negotiate with each enter-
prise separately, it would place the enterprise at a competitive disadvan-
tage either through a strike threat or by forcing it to pay higher wages
than its competitors. The proposal to prevent inter-union funding of
strikes may harm weaker unions and inhibit organization in such areas
of the nation as the South where wage rates are low. This, however, does
not impair the concept but illustrates some problems with which Kutner
grappled.
A new problem has been the emergence of the conglomerate enter-
prise whereby a single management controls diverse companies in diverse
industries. The response may be conglomerate labor unions. Kutner's
flexible proposal anticipates this development. Moreover, the emergence
of automation and the managerial society has radically changed the
corporate structure and affected the growth and organization of unions.
Legislation must anticipate this development and be cautiously formu-
lated in a pragmatic manner.
Kutner's proposals may be regarded as a contribution to the discus-
sion for developing new tools to deal with the newly developing problems
of industrial relations. But, as he would himself recognize, they are not
ultimate solutions. As he wryly comments, "Like life, all is transition."
E. Unfair Comment: A Warning to News Media-Free
Press and Fair Trial
Another area of concern to Kutner has been the safeguarding of an
individual's freedom through an impartial trial free of news media in-
trusion. In this regard, he wrote a scholarly article on prejudicial pub-
licity of the accused and criminal proceedings published in the University
of Miami Law Review in 1962. 9 The article reviewed the cases and
discussed the state of the law up to that time in an attempt to set forth
guidelines for defense counsel, prosecuting attorneys and judges. The
article offered a useful guide on this subject and anticipated contemporary
discussion. This precipitated nation-wide debate, seminars and voluminous
tomes. In this instance, Kutner epitomized the Socratic gadfly. Cases
were reversed on Kutner's anticipating instinct for the correct trend in
the judicial arena affecting defendants' rights. Publishers and bar asso-
ciations throughout the country picked up the baton Kutner cogently
waved.
99. Kutner, Unfair Comment: A Warning to News Media, 17 U. MiAMI L. REv. 51
(1962).
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IV. THE ADVOCATE AS PRACTITIONER
Though Kutner has contributed to the development of the law by
his legal writings, his major contributions have been as a practitioner.
He has not hesitated to expand the law into new fields. Some of these
contributions will be discussed.
A. Protecting the Rights of Prisoners and the Accused
The recognized rights of the accused in American courts today were
established by the relentless and sometimes bitter struggles of advocates
like Luis Kutner. His pioneering has helped assure that all prisoners are
given access to courts to petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus. Apply-
ing the ancient common law principle of bringing jailed inmates before
the courts every thirty days, Kutner obtained a Federal District Court
injunction compelling the prison warden to permit prisoners to be brought
before the court on a monthly basis. In one month alone he brought over
two hundred prisoners before a United States district court for a deter-
mination of the legality of their detention. No longer could persons be
taken away and detained indefinitely without a charge being brought
against them. Where the federal prosecutor had brought charges against
a number of individuals and had them held for an extended period of
time without a trial, Kutner was able to induce a district court judge to
act on his own motion to order the release of twenty prisoners because
the prosecution had delayed the prosecution unduly.'00
In another dramatic incident, Kutner compelled a warden of the
Stateville Penitentiary in Joliet, Illinois, by court order to appear before
a federal district court judge who, in an opinion presented across the
bench, ordered him to refrain from interfering with the rights of prison-
ers to prepare and file petitions for Writs of Habeas Corpus, thus estab-
lishing the principle that all prisoners have civil rights including the right
to file habeas corpus petitions in federal courts, regardless of whether
they may appear to lack merit. It is for the court to make the determina-
tion and not the warden of a prison. At the time, Kutner was denounced
as gpening the jailhouse doors.10'
In 1949, Kutner was the focus of wide attention when he filed suit
under the Civil Rights Statutes10 2 in the United States District Court in
Chicago on behalf of three convicts who were confined in Stateville Peni-
tentiary seeking damages in the sum of three hundred thousand dollars.' 0 '
100. This information is based on conversations with Kutner and cannot be readily docu-
mented. The specific case was United States v. Harold Lawrence, No. 32432 (N.D. Ill., Mar.
Term, 1940).
101. This information Is likewise based upon conversations with Kutner.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). The case is cited as Siegel v. Ragen, 88 F. Supp. 996
(1949), 180 F.2d 785 (1950), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950), reh. denied, 340 U.S. 847
(1950). The proceedings were extensively reported in the Chicago Tribune and the Chicago
Sun-Times during the year of 1949.
103. Id.
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The suit charged that the plaintiff prisoners and some eight thousand
others of their class in Illinois were denied their civil rights in that they
were subjected to cruel and inhuman treatment by being arbitrarily
placed in solitary confinement-"the hole"-for extended periods of
time, being denied an adequate diet, and in being subject to a form of
slavery by not having their cases considered for parole. The suit further
charged prison officials with making personal use of prison labor and of
taking a portion of the proceeds from the prison food concessions.
Though the District Court dismissed the case because of lack of jurisdic-
tion and this ruling was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, the publicity led to parole for the prisoner plain-
tiffs. The publicity generated by the suit resulted in the initiation of
prison reforms.
Kutner's representation of James Montgomery, the Waukegan
Negro who was allegedly framed by the Klan to serve a life sentence for
allegedly raping a half-witted white woman, was in the highest traditions
of the legal profession. 0
James Montgomery had served twenty-two years in prison. He had
protested police harassment of Negroes in Waukegan and sought to
organize Negroes to resist. The police had raided his home and made his
house a shambles. Later, when he threatened to sue for trespassing, police
authorities gave him a check for $600. The Klan arranged to frame him
by inducing a mentally deranged woman who had been bruised and
beaten to accuse him of rape. The Klan had threatened to lynch him,
and he was subjected to police brutality. A twelve-minute trial was con-
ducted with the jury being selected before he was brought to the court-
room. After the woman had testified, the prosecution rested and the jury
convicted him. His attorney was intimidated by the Klan. Kutner con-
ducted his own investigation of the case, studying the trial transcript and
finding witnesses with regard to the Klan's plot. Searching hospital
records for ten nights, he found a physician's report that the woman who
had made the charge and testified had not even been molested, let alone
raped. By gaining secret admittance into the Klan headquarters (with the
aid of two clients he had freed with Habeas Corpus), Kutner obtained
a record of the plot against Montgomery. He found the attending phy-
sician and a nurse and also learned that the woman, who had subse-
quently been confined to a mental hospital, had died, chaste as her
religious faith had dictated. With this evidence he attempted to obtain
a pardon for Montgomery from the Governor who denied his petition.
Kutner took no fee for his services, lost over one hundred thousand
dollars in legal business, and expended extensively from his own funds.
After having clearly exhausted all state remedies, Kutner petitioned
for a federal Writ of Habeas Corpus which was granted by United States
District Judge Michael L. Igoe of the United States District Court in
104. United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1949).
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Chicago in an opinion which characterized the Great Writ as "the sword
and shield in the long struggle for freedom and constitutional govern-
ment. °5 The judge denounced the trial as a "sham and pretense" and
excoriated the tactics of the prosecution in suppressing the hospital
records. Citing Jones v. Commonwealth,"°6 the court found that these
tactics and the general conduct of the trial deprived Montgomery of his
right to due process of law under the fourteenth amendment. Though not
referring to any specific provision of the first eight amendments, Judge
Igoe held that Montgomery was denied what may be regarded as the
standards of fundamental fairness as embodied in the concept of due
process.
10 7
The Montgomery case was only one of many cases where Kutner
obtained the release of a prisoner who had been framed. Another case
involved Raymond Boyd, a small-town Iowa boy who was wrongfully
convicted of murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment, serving
seventeen years in prison. In 1931, he had been in a speakeasy in Peoria
where he had lost money gambling. He then saw the dealer dealing from
the bottom of the deck; and, when he complained, the dealer reached
for a gun. Boyd was knocked unconscious. After he had regained con-
sciousness, he had found someone had been killed and he was charged
with the murder. The prosecutor offered to drop the charges in return
for payment of $5,000. Boyd's mother withdrew this sum from the bank,
but the prosecutor raised his price to $40,000. When the case came to
trial, Boyd's attorney moved for a continuance to prepare their case,
which the presiding judge, who later was appointed to the Illinois Su-
preme Court, denied. The attorney then stated that their only alterna-
tive would have been to plead guilty, a plea which the judge indicated
he was willing to accept. The prosecutor charged that Boyd had been
mentally ill, but the judge failed to order an investigation. Shortly after
the filing of this case, the prosecutor, who had subsequently become
state's attorney, was himself charged, along with other Peoria officials,
with having links to gamblers. Before Kutner had entered the case,
Boyd's arthritic mother had valiantly championed her son's cause, spend-
ing over $50,000 of her own funds.
Kutner's petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus was dismissed by
Judge Igoe, though jurisdiction was retained to permit leave to appeal.08
When Kutner filed a Petition for Appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Igoe, in conference, indicated
that the reason he had dismissed the petition was because the hearing of
the matter would have meant possible embarrassment to the judge who
105. Id.
106. 97 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1938).
107. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46
(1947).
108. No. 47-171 (N.D. Ill., filed 1948). The facts regarding the disposition of the case
are as revealed to the writer in conversations with Kutner.
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had convicted Boyd and had subsequently been appointed Justice of
the Illinois Supreme Court. He urged Kutner to withdraw the petition
and promised he would intervene with the justice and the governor to
obtain Boyd's release. Boyd was subsequently released.
Kutner was threatened with execution by the crime syndicate when,
in 1948, he opened the prison gates for four men who had been confined
for thirteen years for a murder which they did not commit.10 The four-
Bruno Austin, Alex Shapiro, Morris Jacobs and David Sinnenberg-had
been sentenced in 1935 to life terms. As youths they had engaged in
petty crimes; and, after being informed that a West Side Chicago grocery
store was a front for a crime syndicate operation, three of the youths
entered the store one morning with guns drawn while the fourth remained
outside in a car. At that point a customer was leaving the store, but was
suddenly felled by a fatal chest wound from a gun shot. The youths
claimed at their initial trial that the shot had come from the rear of the
store and that they had fired no shots, while the owner had testified there
was nobody in the rear at the time. The owner's son also had a gun, but
testified he was asleep. A ballistics expert had testified that he had
examined two shotguns: a revolver and a Luger pistol; that it contained
four remaining cartridges in the clip which ordinarily held nine cart-
ridges; and that the barrel of the Luger showed a smokeless powder
residue, indicating the weapon had been recently fired. Though on cross-
examination, he admitted making a ballistics report to the police, no copy
was made available for submission in evidence. On further cross-exami-
nation, the expert admitted that the residue could have remained for
three days after the gun had been fired. One of the youths identified the
owner's son as having fired the shots and that another of the youths had
been wounded. The police had arrived only twenty minutes after the
shooting and were clearly concerned with outward appearances. The
prosecution mobilized its efforts to convict the four youths despite clear
evidence to the contrary.
The youths filed a writ of error to the Illinois Supreme Court, which
was denied."' Certiorari was never brought to the United States Supreme
Court as the youths were without funds to employ counsel and were
prevented from seeking review pro se within the statutory period because
of a then existing practice in Illinois prisons preventing persons incarcer-
ated by the state from access to the courts except by counsel hired to
represent them.
In 1945 the store owner's son, after being inducted into the armed
forces, experienced a religious conversion and, on the advice of his chap-
lain, filed an affidavit confessing that he had actually committed the
109. The case is reported in the Chicago Daily News, May 10, 1948, at 1-2, and in the
files of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, United States
ex rel. Austin v. Ragen, No. 47-399 (N.D. Ill., filed 1948).
110. People v. Shapiro, 371 Il. 234, 20 N.E.2d 284 (1939).
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murder and had given perjured testimony. A polygraph test confirmed
that he was now telling the truth. New attempts were made to achieve the
youths' release. The trial judge stated in an affidavit that if this testimony
had been heard at the trial, the youths would not have been convicted.
However, a Petition for a Writ of Error Coram Nobis was denied in
the Criminal Court of Cook County with the presiding judge holding
that, since more than five years had elapsed, Error Coram Nobis was
unavailable. This holding was affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court"
and by the Illinois Supreme Court without the rendering of an opinion.
An application for Habeas Corpus which was brought to the trial court
was also denied. Certiorari was then brought to the United States Su-
preme Court and denied. Clearly, the youths had exhausted all state
remedies. A Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the federal courts
was also dismissed.
A second petition for a federal writ, alleging grounds for federal
jurisdiction, was filed in forma pauperis, and Kutner was appointed
amicus curiae. Kutner began to fight like an enraged lion. Judge Igoe
granted a hearing, finding adequate grounds for jurisdiction in that the
youths were denied the due process of law under the fourteenth amend-
ment. The State filed a Petition to dismiss the Writ and after Kutner
filed a motion to deny the State's motion to dismiss, a hearing was held.
During the argument, Kutner's mother was in court on the only occasion
to watch her son in action. The motion was denied and the state filed a
return to the Writ with an answer filed, and the court held a hearing.
The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus charged that the convictions
were obtained in violation of due process by virtue of fraud, subornation
of perjury and suppression of evidence. Charges of fraud alleged were
that a new gun was substituted for that belonging to the grocer's son;
the firing of the youths' gun for a ballistics test after their arrest; a
ballistics test of their gun which was not fired during the robbery; and
the suppression of all documents and evidence which would have proven
the youths innocent of the crime of murder. On the charge of subornation
of perjury the Petition further alleged the false testimony of the ballis-
tics expert that the youths' gun had been recently fired; that he falsely
stated the ballistics report was in the possession of the police at the time
of trial; and his withdrawal of the records from the Coroner's office. On
the charge of suppression of evidence, the Petition alleged that the
store owner's son suppressed the truth of his shooting and killing the
customer when he intended to kill the youths, his hiding of the weapon in
the sand in the basement of the grocery store, the suppression of the
bullets and shells found at the scene of the alleged crime, and suppression
of the ballistics report.
Judge Igoe, after hearing the evidence, ordered the youths released.
111. People v. Austin, 329 Ill. App. 276, 65 N.E.2d 632 (1946).
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He held, in an unpublished opinion," 2 that "the writ of habeas corpus is
available not only to determine points of jurisdiction, stricti juris, and
constitutional questions, but to prevent a complete miscarriage of jus-
tice," and "will issue if the newly discovered evidence is of such character
as completely to undermine the entire case on which the prosecution is
based.""' He castigated the handling of the matter by the State of Illi-
nois.
Of significance is Judge Igoe's statement as to due process of law.
[D] ue process of law is that process of impartial law which is
binding because it is right. It implies in its original conception
respect for the law because it safeguards the rights of all
persons who live in free and untrammeled intercourse in a
society of their fellows. Due process is concerned with the
ultimate consequences of calculated realities affiliated with fact.
It senses the mistakes of the past and wants to rectify them.
It has great passion for interposing reason for dilemma in inte-
grating a socio-legal society. It equips the lonely fighter for
judicial progress with tools and ammunition. It corrects the
errors of humans who alternately minimize and maximize the
legal norm between choice and promise. It provides men with
faith."4
Judge Igoe after further discussion commented further:
There is nothing whimsical in due process. It provides 'meaning
of law' in the lives of men and women. It provides deft scalpel
for laying bare of half-truth or an overstated truth, or in prob-
ing the legalistic insolvency of some brave array of argument in
support of specious resistance to the liberty of one wrongfully
in custody. It creates synthesis out of confusion. It must not be
used to cloak or condone a sovereign state's cumbersome legal
procedures. In the case at bar, it is a sharp instrument for
puncturing many pretensions, effectively probing for obscure
motivations and for uncovering hidden truths."
The judge quoted approvingly from Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion
in Adamson v. People o1 California"' concerning the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause as conferring rights independent of those
enumerated in the Bill of Rights.
This opinion should be considered together with Judge Igoe's
published opinion in Montgomery"6 where he had likewise stressed the
use of the concept of due process and habeas corpus. The cases dra-
matically demonstrate the interrelationship between due process and
112. United States ex rel. Austin v. Ragen, No. 47-399 (N.D. ll., filed 1948).
113. Id. at 11-12.
114. Id. at 43.
115. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
116. 86 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Il1. 1949).
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the writ of habeas corpus as the sword and shield. They stand as great
monuments indeed to a judge who has passed away but recently. Never-
theless, the role of Kutner as advocate in exerting his efforts to bring
these cases before the court and in presenting creative argument for the
judge to present his opinion and develop precedent is vastly significant.
A comparison of Kutner's brief and memoranda with the judge's opinion
graphically demonstrates how the one influences the other.
These cases reflect the inadequacies of the American legal system
in showing that the innocent may be convicted and punished unjustly.
The very nature of the judicial system, which is dependent upon making
subjective factual determinations, makes such mistakes inevitable. How-
ever, to minimize the occurrence of such mistakes in criminal cases, the
standards of due process place obligations of fairness upon the prose-
cutor within the context of the adversary system. Clearly, these cases
epitomize a flagrant abuse of the prosecutorial process. The most shock-
ing aspect, however, was the failure of state legal and political institu-
tions to act to rectify these judicial errors after they had become apparent.
Only the happenstance appearance of an advocate like Kutner, who was
willing to invoke federal remedies, enabled justice to triumph. Today,
thanks to the efforts of such advocates, precedents have been established
which protect the rights of the accused to a greater extent.1 7 Present-
day legal procedure manifests a greater concern for assuring that the
innocent should not be convicted. But the danger remains. The fate of a
man unjustly convicted should not depend upon the happenstance of an
encounter with a sympathetic advocate. Though Kutner's campaign in
the 1940's for poor man's justice was to be commended, the ultimate
solution lies in establishing an institution, perhaps an ombudsman-type
plan, to ferret out such cases.
B. Protecting the Rights of Soldiers
During the Korean War, some American Armed Forces personnel
who were captured by the Communist forces submitted to the pressures
of degradation, brainwashing, and ultimately "collaborated." Following
the release of American prisoners, accusations were made regarding the
behavior of many. The Army conducted special inquiries pursuant to a
presidential executive order that pierced the armor of due process.
One case which received considerable attention through the Chicago
Tribune"8 involved Douglas Stephens, who had been a prisoner of war
for more than two years. Two months after he was freed, he was given
117. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) ; Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
118. Stephens v. Brucker, No. 55 (N.D. Ill., filed 1968). The petition asserted jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and alleged a denial of constitutional rights in that the proceed-
ings against Stephens constituted a Bill of Attainder (art. 1, sec. 9, clause 3 of the United
States Constitution) and a denial of Fifth Amendment due process.
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an honorable discharge and re-enlisted a few months later. Then in
November 1954, he was subjected to charges that he "collaborated" and
"consorted" with the enemy while a prisoner. It was alleged he had made
broadcasts and received preferential treatment in the form of better
medical care; was invited to go on walks with camp officials; was granted
a relatively greater amount of freedom of movement about the camp;
had received better food, such as candy, apples and other delicacies;
and had been assigned to little or no work details. Stephens was further
accused of assisting the Communist propaganda campaign by making
recordings which were used for propaganda purposes; writing articles
concerning the good treatment of prisoners of war; circulating and sign-
ing petitions promoting the Communist cause; participating in study
group meetings and attending lectures on the alleged use of bacteriologi-
cal warfare by the United States Air Force; spending a great deal of
time reading a great number of books on communism; and playing cards,
volleyball, basketball and going "swimming" with prison camp officials.
Stephens denied the charges, though claiming he made a broadcast
when a prison camp official threatened physical indignities and that he
would not see his folks again. Stephens was not subjected to a formal
court martial but only to a hearing before a special Field Board of three
colonels under a procedure which permitted him to retain counsel but
required him to pay his own expenses for calling witnesses on his own
behalf, many of whom were scattered about the globe. He could not
face his accusers nor cross-examine them, and only the Board could
have access to the government's evidence. Though five sergeants sub-
mitted depositions on his behalf and after he had passed a lie detector
test, the Board recommended that he be separated from the service with
less than an honorable discharge. He was denied the benefits generally
accorded veterans and the special $2.50 per day bonus awarded by
Congress to former war prisoners.
Kutner filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, alleging that
Stephens was denied his constitutional rights to due process of law under
the fifth amendment to the Constitution and that the Army proceedings
against him had constituted a Bill of Attainder.11 Secretary of the Army
Wilbur Brucker was designated as the Defendant. A hearing was held.
The Army, eager to avoid a legal precedent, agreed to restore full rights
to Stephens and the 134 other veterans similarly convicted. In a subse-
quent proceeding before the Foreign Claims Commission, Stephens and
the other former prisoners of war were granted full compensation. Kutner
and the Army stipulated to have the case dismissed. The Army subse-
quently revised its procedures as Field Boards were abandoned. Kutner,
who had assumed the case without a fee, had thus vindicated the rights
of veterans and was instrumental in changing Army procedure.
119. Note, The Court of Military Appeals and'the Bill of Rights: A New Look, 36
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 435 (1967).
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The law has increasingly recognized that constitutional rights apply
to servicemen. 2 0 The Court has also recognized that an ex-serviceman
need not be compelled to stand trial for offenses allegedly committed
while in service.'
C. Habeas Corpus and Inter-Country Adoption
Kutner demonstrated the use of Habeas Corpus in protecting the
rights of a child and his adoptive parents under an inter-country adoption
arrangement from the arbitrary and capricious action of a social welfare
agency involving a Catholic Archdiocese. 2
The adoptive parents had, pursuant to the laws of Quebec, 23 con-
tracted to adopt a child conferring upon the parents' rights of de facto
adoption: the right to the child for a six-month probationary period. In
compliance with the Immigration and Naturalization Statute,'24 the child
was granted a visa and admitted as a non-quota immigrant to the United
States. The Quebec adoption agency, Le Sauvegarde de L'Enfance,
delegated the Catholic Home Bureau in Chicago to act as its agent in
servicing the adoption, which was under the administration of the
Chicago Diocese. Subsequently, the Joliet Diocese was split from the
Chicago Diocese, and the case was transferred to the latter with con-
comitant supervision, authority and obligation. The child lived with
his adoptive parents in Addison, Illinois.
The child then suffered two household accidents, first bumping his
head in a collision with his adopted sister, and then hurting his head again
by slipping in the bath tub and manifesting such symptoms as a wobbly
gait, in-turned eye, and inability to reach and pull a light string. The
family pediatrician referred the parents to a specialist in neurology and
pediatrics at Illinois Neuropsychiatric Research Hospital where the child
was taken and operated upon to alleviate internal pressures caused by
the injuries. The mother visited the child virtually every day, changing
and laundering his linen and hospital gowns. When the adoptive parents
were advised that the child had progressed sufficiently to be released as
an out-patient, the Catholic Charities of Joliet refused to let the hospital
release the child to the parents. Orders were issued to the hospital and
the parents that they were no longer permitted to visit the child. Subse-
quently, these orders were cancelled with a notation on the hospital
records that the "hospital does not have authority for this." However,
the director of the Catholic Charities of Joliet wrote a letter to the
parents on the same day barring them from seeing the child and sent a
120. Id.
121. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarels, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
122. Berard v. Catholic Home Bureau, Habeas Corpus Case No. 66 L 6182 (Cir. Ct. of
Cook County, Ill.).
123. 3 REv. STATS. OF QUEBEC, ch. 220 (1964).
124. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1155(b), 1204 (1964).
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carbon copy to the hospital. The director arranged to have the child
placed in a foster home and sent a letter to the attending physician intro-
ducing the foster parents. But at a meeting at the Chancery Office in
Joliet, the Director reassured the parents that the child would be all
right in a few weeks and that they would be allowed to visit him in the
hospital, deliberately concealing his intention, and definite arrangement,
to place the child in a foster home. Shortly before Christmas, the child
was abruptly taken out of the hospital, though he was brought to a
hospital for the adoptive parents to see briefly on Christmas day and
then returned to the foster home. The adoptive parents were required
to pay the hospital bill.
The parents, after having exerted every effort to regain the custody
of the child, including two visits to Quebec, read and heard about Kut-
ner's speech before the Inter-American Bar in San Juan, Puerto Rico.
A Petition for Adoption was filed in the Circuit Court of du Page County,
Illinois, which was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds in that the Quebec
adoption agency had not accorded its consent in accordance with the
requirements of the Illinois Statute." 5 A Petition for Habeas Corpus was
then filed in the Cook County Circuit Court pursuant to Illinois Stat-
ute,'26 with the Catholic Home Bureau and its Director designated as
Respondents. Investigation had revealed that the child was living in
Cook County.
The Petition alleged that the adoptive parents were the duly quali-
fied and acting guardians and were given legal custody and control of the
child "in conformity with inter-country adoption procedures established
between the United States and Canada, the immigration laws of the
United States of America, and the adoption laws of the Province of
Quebec, Canada and the State of Illinois." The previous Petition for
Adoption had asserted rights under the comity of nations, the United
Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child, which was
adopted by the General Assembly on November 29, 1959.127
The Habeas Corpus proceedings resulted in bringing out in open
court and through the press facts indicating collusion by the Catholic
Charities of Joliet and its Director with the attending physician to
deprive the adoptive parents of their child and that, though the Catholic
Home Bureau of Chicago had been delegated by the Quebec agency to
act as its proxy, no such authority had been delegated to the Catholic
Charities of Joliet. Only a week before the scheduled hearing for the
writ did a church official go to Quebec to obtain an affidavit of authoriza-
tion to act on behalf of Le Sauvegarde de L'Enfance. Testimony by the
Assistant Director of the Quebec Agency, who was brought to the trial by
125. ILL. STATS. ANN., ch. 4, §§ 9.1-5 to 9.1-7 (1965).
126. ILL. STATS. AN., ch. 65 (1965).
127. GILDSTEIN & KATY, THE FAMILY AND THE LAW 836-37 (1965).
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Kutner, revealed that the adoption contract with the adoptive parents
had not been terminated and that their files indicated no reason as to
why it should have been.
The local agencies failed to present concrete evidence to support
their contention that the child had been mistreated. Though Illinois reg-
ulations require that a representative of an agency supervising an adop-
tion must make home visits every ninety days, the home of the adopting
couple was visited by a social worker only once during the eleven-month
period in which the child was with the adoptive parents. The attending
physician had made vague statements in a letter to the Catholic Chari-
ties that the child had been subjected to trauma as a cause for the
injuries, but he was unable to provide a basis for this allegation when
subjected to cross-examination. Furthermore, testimony by the adoptive
father indicated the physician had made contradictory statements to him.
The physician's testimony established that he had discussed the case with
the Director of Catholic Charities in Joliet and had sent a letter to the
nurses instructing them not to reveal the identity of the foster parents
to the adoptive parents.
The local agencies apparently objected to leaving the child with
the adoptive parents because they felt that, due to his illness, he was
not a fit child for adoption, though they had subsequently placed him
in two foster homes. However, the testimony of the father indicated the
child had manifested symptoms of being defective when the adoptive
parents first took him from the Quebec Agency at the age of twenty-
seven months.
After the evidence was presented and Kutner was about to call Arch-
bishop John Cody (now Cardinal), the Head of the Chicago Archdiocese,
the presiding judge interrupted the proceedings and called the counsel
into conference and indicated that he would telescope the proceedings
and grant an order for adoption if the parties would agree to seek the
final consent from the Quebec Agency. This was granted pending a check
on the home by a social worker, and the adopting parents were then
allowed to file a Petition for Adoption.
The significance of this case may be somewhat limited as precedent
in Illinois since the state supreme court in a matter which also, ironically,
involved Kutner as counsel, appears to have limited the efficacy of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus as a means for adoptive parents to obtain cus-
tody of children from an agency by holding that the writ may properly
be invoked only where the jurisdiction of the Court ruling upon a
Petition for Adoption is collaterally attacked.12 8 This matter is again
pending before the Illinois Supreme Court. 29
However, the case discussed is of significance in apparently repre-
senting what may well be the first known successful use of the Writ of
128. Greco v. Chicago Foundlings Home, 38 Ill.2d 289, 230 N.E.2d 865 (1967).
129. Docket No. 41218.
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Habeas Corpus to gain the custody of a child in an inter-country adop-
tion proceeding. Furthermore, the case demonstrates the use of the Writ,
when properly invoked, as a sword and shield to correct any and all
injustices in piercing the sham and pretense of any proceeding.
The case also focuses upon certain unresolved problems of inter-
country adoption. The federal statute and procedures provide for
certain requirements which must be met to permit a child to enter the
United States for adoption. The adopting parents must file affidavits of
support and undergo an investigation by the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare and the secretary of this department must then
certify to the Attorney General that the couple are capable of caring
properly for the child. The Attorney General then issues a permit, and
the visa is authorized by the Secretary of State. The Statute provides
that the adoption would be undertaken pursuant to state law.
Mr. Justice Black in Hines v. Davidowitz,'130 in holding that under
the supremacy clause of the Constitution 13 1 Congress had occupied the
field and pre-empted state regulation as to immigration and the regula-
tion of aliens so that a Pennsylvania statute requiring the registration
of aliens was found to be invalid. Furthermore, where Congress, "by
treaty or statute has established rules and regulations touching the rights,
privileges, obligations or burdens of aliens as such, the treaty is the
supreme law of the land [and] no state can add or take from the force
and effect of such treaty or statute. .. ."
Kutner argued that because the federal law protects the rights of the
alien child admitted to the United States for adoption and establishes a
statutory scheme, a social welfare agency, acting as custodial guardian,
should not be permitted-in acting under state authority-to interfere
with these rights by arbitrarily taking the child from the adoptive
parents nor by withholding its consent to the child's adoption, and that
in these proceedings the court is pursuing a ministerial function in
implementing the federal scheme.
Clearly, the case points to the need for Congress to clarify the
statute to prevent a social welfare agency or other custodial guardian
from arbitrarily withholding its consent to the adoption of an alien who
has been admitted to the United States pursuant to the Immigration and
Naturalization Statute and to permit either a state or federal court to
grant the adoption if it finds such a course to be in the best interests of
the child. The case further demonstrates that the court should not be
compelled to surrender its decision-making functions to the whim and
caprice of a social welfare agency in determining the child's custody
and adoption."3 2
130. 312 U.S. 52 (1941). On adoption of infants, see In re Petition of Chin Thioot Har
Wong, 224 F. Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
131. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
132. See note, 39 MuNN. L. REv. 567 (1955).
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Another problem brought out by this case is the need for interna-
tional agreements providing standards for the placement of children for
inter-country adoption. The child was placed with the adopting couple
by the Quebec agency after they had seen him only twice over a span
of a half-hour and were not permitted to examine him in the nude, though
they subsequently found chest scars indicating that he was operated upon
for pleurisy and his behavior indicated he was a defective child. But the
report of the Quebec Agency stated he was in good health. Furthermore,
the relationship between this agency and the Catholic Home Bureau in
Chicago was never formalized but only verbal, and the latter's authority
was not explicit.
Though the Hague Conference on Private International Law has
adopted a number of conventions focusing on problems of jurisdiction
and conflict of laws with respect to adoption,'33 these conventions do not
focus upon the need for establishing standards involving sociological
and psychological considerations in the placement of children for inter-
country adoption." 4 Such standards could, perhaps, be best achieved
through a series of bilateral treaties with nations from which a sizable
number of children are admitted to the United States for adoption.
D. Jewish War Veterans v. George Lincoln Rockwell, American
Nazi Party: An Historical Precedent
The role of the advocate in making law was dramatically exemplified
by Kutner's representation of the Jewish War Veterans in stopping
George Lincoln Rockwell, the late self-styled "fuehrer" of the American
Nazi Party, from demonstrating in Jewish neighborhoods within the City
of Chicago.
In September 1966, as the long hot summer of racial clash was com-
ing to a climax, the swastika suddenly began to appear in certain parts of
Chicago where open housing demonstrations had been conducted by Dr.
Martin Luther King. A branch of the American Nazi Party had been
functioning in Chicago, and George Lincoln Rockwell flew in from his
headquarters in Virginia to provide his leadership to white men who were
violently resisting the Negro efforts for integration. To him the situation
133. Draft Convention Concerning the Power of Authority and the Law Applicable
in Respect to Protection of Infants, 9 Am. J. ComP. L. 708 (1960) ; Draft Convention on
Law Applicable to Obliging Support of Minor Children, 5 Am. J. ComP. L. 656 (1956);
Conference de la Haye de Droite Internationale Prive, Convention concernant Des Autorities
la Loi Applicable et la Reconnaissance Des Decisions en Matiere d'Adoption, summarized
in Lipstein, The Tenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 1965
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 224. This last convention was opposed by the United States Department of
State as containing reservations, exceptions and restrictions to such an extent that its useful-
ness is questionable. [DEPT. STATE BULL., Feb. 22, 1965, at 263.1
134. This need was reflected in a special United Nations Seminar on Intercountry
Adoption sponsored by the United Nations Technical Assistance Office in Geneva, U.N. Doc.
UN/TAD/SEM/1960/Rep. 2.
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was an opportunity for exploitation as part of his conspiracy to ultimately
seize power and deprive Jews and Negroes of their constitutional rights.
He sought to link the Jews with the Negroes' struggle for equal
rights by planning a mass rally and by marching on Jewish neighbor-
hoods, contending that the Jews were behind the efforts to integrate the
races. Whether by design or coincidence, he indicated an intention to
demonstrate on Rosh Hashana, the Jewish New Year, thereby interfering
with Jewish worship. The Jewish War Veterans of Illinois, one of the
oldest of Jewish communal organizations, with 1500 members, sought
to take action to stop Rockwell and found a ready advocate in Kutner,
a long-time foe of Nazism and all forms of racism. Efforts by the National
Jewish War Veterans Organization to deter Rockwell and his group
from demonstrating in other cities had failed because of United States
Supreme Court precedents involving the free speech provisions of the
first amendment.
Kutner, however, in spite of opposition and disavowal by the Na-
tional Organization and without any assistance of other Jewish Organi-
zations, like Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, American Jewish
Congress, United Jewish Appeal, American Jewish Committee, and
others, decided to invoke the little used provisions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, Title 42, Sections 1983 and 1985(3) of the United States
Code. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage or any State or territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitutional
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Intended to protect the Southern Negro after his emancipation, there
were no precedents invoking this provision to protect groups or persons
from interference with religious practices.
That Rockwell and the American Nazi Party would be acting under
"color of law" could be established, in that his organization was chartered
as a corporation under the laws of Virginia and, in that, Rockwell had
applied for a police permit to undertake the demonstrations and expected
to receive police protection while using public thoroughfares. During a
previous march into a Negro neighborhood, police protection was exten-
sive and had included the use of helicopters. Rockwell had also made use
of the mails. The dicta of Supreme Court decisions had considerably
broadened the concept of state action to encompass situations where "the
participation of the State was peripheral or its action was only one of
several cooperative forces leading to the constitutional violation"'135 and
135. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
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that the allegation of official action may charge "no more than coopera-
tive private and state action."'136
The case of Collins v. Hardyman, in which the Supreme Court
refused to extend relief under Section 1985 (3) of Title 42, United States
Code, to a political group opposing the Marshall Plan whose meetings
had been broken up by the American Legion, is distinguishable. Mr.
Justice Jackson limited the application of this section to instances in-
volving state action, or the complete breakdown of state law enforcement,
and construed the statute as falling into two parts: the first defining
punishable conspiracies, and the second describing overt acts to make
the conspiracy actionable. The overt act must be in furtherance of the
limited conspiracy for the purpose of depriving any person of the equal
protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the
law. But he stressed, there must be an element of state action. However,
Justice Jackson acknowledged that some private conspiracies could be
of such magnitude as to come within the statute.
We do not say that no conspiracy by private individuals could
be of such magnitude and effect as to work a deprivation of
equal protection of the laws, or equal privileges and immunities
able effectively to deprive Negroes of their legal rights and to
close all avenues of redress or vindication .... But here nothing
of that sort appears. We have a case of a lawless political brawl,
precipitated by a handful of white citizens against other white
citizens. California courts are open to plaintiffs and its laws
offer redress for their injury and vindication for their injury
and vindication for their rights. 3 '
The essence of Justice Jackson's argument is that, while Congress may
give a right of action against individuals who conspire to interfere with
certain federal rights, it did not do so because the qualifying word equal
presupposes state action.
A note in the Yale Law Jounal39 criticized the Collins opinion by
presenting legislative history indicating an intent by Congress for broader
application to encompass private as well as state action and that the
word equal was added to limit the authority of the statute to the preven-
tion of deprivations which attack the equality of rights of American
citizens. Dicta by justices in subsequent cases appear to indicate that
Collins is of limited authority. 4 ° Moreover, the action brought against
136. Id., citing Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); see also Griffin v. Maryland,
378 U.S. 130 (1964).
137. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
138. Id. at 662.
139. Note, Federal Civil Actions against Private Individuals for Crimes Involving Civil
Rights, 74 YALE L.J. 1462 (1965).
140. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 481 (1953) (concurring opinion by Mr. Justice
Clark); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) at 200-01 (concurring opinion by Mr. Justice
Harlan).
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Rockwell also invoked Section 1983, which is broader than Section 1985
(3). The elements for such an action include:
(1) That defendants conspired or acted jointly or in concert;
(2) that defendants acted under color of state law or authority;
(expressly set forth in statute) (3) a discriminatory intent
; (4) that defendants subjected plaintiff (citizen or non-
citizen) to a deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity (due
process, equal protection of the law or equal privileges and im-
munities); (5) that overt acts were done pursuant to the con-
spiracy which damaged plaintiff.' 4 '
The complaint, a masterpiece of Kutner's draftsmanship, filed in
the United States District Court, Northeastern District of Illinois, East-
ern Division (Chicago),142 designated the Jewish War Veterans of the
United States, Department of Illinois, and its Commander as the plain-
tiffs, with the American Nazi Party, World Union National Socialists,
George Lincoln Rockwell, two other named associates in Chicago, and
"500 more or less John Doe Storm Troopers of the American Nazi Party,
and 1500 more or less John Doe Members of the American Nazi Party,
and all other persons acting by, through or in their behalf" as defendants.
The American Nazi Party was organized by the self-styled fuehrer,
George Lincoln Rockwell, the son of a vaudeville actor, educated at
Brown University, and a Navy veteran. Failing to succeed at any occupa-
tion, he formed his organization in 1958 with national headquarters at
Arlington, Virginia, and organized under the laws of Virginia. The organi-
zation received financial aid from certain wealthy individuals and had
established branches in several cities throughout the United States, in-
cluding Chicago. The complaint alleged that the defendants engaged
in public demonstrations and meetings to incite riots and create distur-
bances of the peace, distributes nationally and internationally anti-Jew
and anti-Negro hate literature containing depraved obscenities and
vulgar racist deprecations, and makes public threats of exterminating
and inflicting genocide upon the Jews and Negroes; and that the defen-
dants were publicly dedicated to resurrect, by violence, the principles of
National Socialism through its affiliate international organization, World
Union National Socialists. The latter organization, also headquartered
in Arlington, Virginia, was the international duplicate of the American
Nazi Party and was also formed by Rockwell. In court testimony, Rock-
well claimed that the only incorporated organization was the George
Lincoln Rockwell Party and that the American Nazi Party is not "orga-
nized on paper." He claimed to be the "Commander" of the latter by virtue
of the fact that he organized it. There are no by-laws or rules. The second
in command was Major Matt Koehl with Captain Ralph Forbes third in
141. Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 294 (9th Cir. 1959).
142. Civil Action No. 66 C. 1643.
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the chain of command. Units were formed in other cities, subject to
approval and screening by the National Organization.
The complaint alleged that the defendants "act individually and in
concert with each other in pursuit of a common conspiracy under the
name and style of the American Nazi Party and World Union National
Socialists." The defendants were charged with acting contrary to their
charter of incorporation, which asserts "the gaining of political power
by legal means." The complaint further alleged that:
All of the Defendants, individually and in concert with each
other, by agreement, common design or conspiracy, have been
and are engaged in a program of disorderly public meetings and
demonstrations, disseminating degenerate, obscene defamatory
and threatening literature advocating the extermination or
genocide of Jews and Negroes, all intended to subject and to
deprive the Plaintiffs of their rights, privileges or immunities, se-
cured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States. ...
The complaint alleged that a proposed rally at the Chicago Coliseum
and the demonstrations were intended to be in furtherance of the con-
spiracy. Reference was made to a tape recorded interview which was
printed in the April 1966 issue of Playboy Magazine in which Rockwell
expressed adherence to the principles of Mein Kampf, admitted publish-
ing and distributing depraved and obscene hate statements, and having
composed "hate-nanny" lyrics depicting the Negroes as an inferior race.
The complaint further alleged that literature had been sent to Jews
threatening them with death. The complaint alleged in part:
The Defendants, in defiance of the Constitutional rights and
privileges of Plaintiffs and by their course of conduct and their
announced rally on September 10, 1966, intend, under color of
law of the statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs, or usage
of the City of Chicago, Illinois, and the laws of the State of Illi-
nois, to subject Plaintiffs, as citizens of the United States, to be
deprived of their rights, privileges and immunities, secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States. That the con-
duct by the Defendants is purposeful and intentional.
The complaint sought a temporary restraining order and a hearing for a
permanent injunction enjoining Defendants.
Appended to the complaint were two exhibits. "Exhibit 1" con-
sisted of an announcement of a "White People's Rally" at a park in a
neighborhood which had experienced violence and was to be followed
by a "White March" into a "Black Neighborhood" and a rally at a hall
in the evening. The leaflet referred to Rockwell as a man who is fighting
"the black slum invasion of our neighborhoods" with calls to "demon-
strate against the black animals who are trying to turn Chicago into a
deadly and filthy jungle .... Then we will march on the blacks in their
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neighborhoods with masses of 'back to Africa' signs. White Chicago will
not tolerate any invasions of white neighborhoods by black scum."
"Exhibit 2" was a comic book cartoon called "Here Comes White-
man," who is depicted as having replaced Superman and being endowed
with super powers which are used in a duel with "the Jew from Outer-
space" and "Supercoon." Along with this was a cartoon entitled "Boat
Tickets to Africa," suggesting that "this ticket entitled one nigger to a
free trip to Africa."
The Court granted plaintiffs' prayer for a temporary restraining
order, ruled that the complaint was sufficient and the Court had juris-
diction, ordering the defendants to answer within twenty days. Rockwell
appeared as his own lawyer claiming (or pretending) he did not have
sufficient funds to hire counsel and that no lawyer in the Chicago area was
willing to handle his case. However, the local chapter of the American
Civil Liberties Union appeared as Amicus Curiae; and briefs and motions
filed by them were adopted by Rockwell so that an argument could be
made that the American Civil Liberties Union attorneys were representing
him. 4 Because officially he was not represented by counsel, the Court was
induced to relax the rules of evidence to admit testimony and permit utter-
ances which would ordinarily be excluded. However, Rockwell demon-
strated legal knowledge and forensic ability in conducting his defense.
Testimony by Rockwell during the trial indicated that he had in-
tended to march in Jewish neighborhoods to urge Jews to "cease support-
ing the Communist and Negro revolutionary movement" and to cease a
campaign of "legal harassment" aginst him. Rockwell, in testifying on
his own behalf, portrayed himself as a self-styled leader of the White
race. Though Rockwell stressed that he did not desire violence but was
organizing a march of tough white people with discipline required, the
general pattern of the marches and the selected neighborhoods indicated
an intent to actually create disturbances. Thus, the Court issued a tem-
porary injunction enjoining Rockwell and his cohorts from marching on
the Jewish New Year and Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement.
Presiding Judge J. Sam Perry, an able and learned U.S. District
Judge, in rejecting arguments of the Amicus Curiae attorneys as to free
speech, held:
In my judgment, I have heard all of the evidence here. From
the nature of the evidence that has been introduced here, this
exceeds free speech. It amounts to an abuse of free speech. I
think the evidence indicates also that it seeks to incite riot.
143. The distinction between amicus curiae and direct representation has become a
matter of concern to the American Civil Liberties Union in cases concerning individuals
accused of conspiring to counsel draft registrants to refuse military service and to violate
Selective Service regulations. [March-April 1968 CivrL LIBERTIES, 1]. Direct representation,
as distinguished from amicus curiae, means that the attorney has full control in the handling
of the litigation. [Comment by Oxfield, id. at 7.] Whether the Civil Liberties Union actually
had this control in the Rockwell case is to be questioned. [See generally ACLU: Friend of
the Court or Counsel to the Accused?, id. at 7.]
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We have a corporation organized and existing in Virginia,
coming here to Illinois without conforming to the laws of the
State of Illinois, and setting up offices here and purporting to
demonstrate. Certainly, that corporation which has never been
qualified to do business in any manner, shape, or form in this
State has no legal right here.
The thing that strikes me is that all the evidence indicates
clearly to me that these proposed marches in the areas proposed
definitely and deliberately are planned, and the areas chosen,
for the purpose of inciting riots and for revenge, and not to ac-
complish any results, so far as the Defendants themselves are
concerned, to satisfy their grievances.
If these facts were alleged as to some other organization hostile
to the Christian organization about the Christmas holiday. I
would take the same viewpoint about it. The same view I would
take of a Mohammedan holiday, because our Constitution pro-
tects the right to worship as we choose, as to any religion.'44
Judge Perry further asserted:
I believe that the right to worship uninterrupted and undis-
turbed, freedom of religious worship, is just as valuable as the
right to free speech, in my judgment."' 45
The Court so held despite the fact that the proposed route of Rock-
well's marches did not pass a synagogue, but synagogues were within
the vicinity of the march.
The next step was to make the injunction permanent. The temporary
injunction was extended so that, in effect, Rockwell was enjoined from
demonstrating during the Jewish holidays of Succoth and Simchath
Torah. Kutner further maneuvered for an order requiring Rockwell to
produce records of the American Nazi Party and affiliated organizations.
The defendant pleaded lack of time to amass his extensive records, and
they were not produced. He pointed out that neither the American Nazi
Party nor the World Union National Socialists was incorporated. Though
there is private correspondence between Rockwell and leaders of Nazi
parties in other countries, there have never been any meetings other than
a gathering in England. The tenacity of Kutner's cross-examination of
Rockwell produced more pay dirt.
Testimony by Rockwell revealed that the Party did not have a pay-
roll, but that a savings account is maintained. Party functionings drew
from the treasury sums needed for living. Rockwell reluctantly testified
that the then current budget of the American Nazi Party was from thirty
to fifty thousand dollars, although he was evasive on specific Party fi-
nances, and that the sources of funds were from contributions and the
144. Transcript, at 252-54.
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sale of pamphlets. Rockwell refused to state the identity of his contribu-
tors, invoking "the privilege of freedom of association, free speech and
the right of privacy" and "the Constitution and its Amendments against
invasion, unfair and unreasonable invasion." He admitted receiving
contributions from Texas, including assistance from two hundred con-
tributors in Dallas. Rockwell admitted he stayed at the home of a Dallas
resident who contributed $1,000 to $1,500. He then, under further ques-
tioning, stated he received in excess of $2,000, and that he received sums
from this particular source for the past two years. He took the fifth
amendment several times, particularly when Kutner tried to identify a
certain oil tycoon contributor.
Another highlight of the proceedings was the testimony of Rabbi Mor-
decai Simon, Director of the Chicago Board of Rabbis, who was called as
an expert witness by Kutner to testify as to the nature of the Jewish holi-
days and the location of synagogues. Rockwell wanted him to present a
translation of the Kol Nidre prayer. Judge Perry ruled that this was
unnecessary. Subsequently, a tape recorder was spotted on Rockwell's
table, and its contents revealed a telephone conversation with a colleague
in Virginia who read a translation of the Kol Nidre prayer. Rockwell
attempted to use the old anti-Semitic technique of challenging a Jewish
witness on the grounds that his oath is allegedly meaningless because the
prayer announced a repudiation of all vows. As Rabbi Simon indicated,
the prayer, composed in Talmudic times regarding Roman prosecutions,
referred only to vows made between man and God and not between man
and man. Rockwell and his supporters at the trial did not seek to hide
their contempt of Jews, whom Rockwell referred to as a "raft of Com-
munists."
Rockwell testified that he believed 80 per cent of the Jews could be
convicted of treason. He admitted making statements that he would have
to gas Jews if he became President of the United States, as he intended
in 1972. Rockwell also testified that he did not believe that six million
Jews were exterminated by the Nazis, claiming it was a hoax.
Kutner introduced published statements and interviews by Rockwell
referring to the "six million barbecued Hebes," as well as other mali-
ciously inspired attacks. His statements were clearly of a nature to incite
a riot.
After considering all of the evidence and briefs submitted by the
plaintiffs' attorney and the Amicus Curiae, Judge Perry granted a perma-
nent injunction, the world's historic first against conspirators and a
racist organization, holding that the first and fourteenth amendments
as interpreted by the Supreme Court implicitly forbid individuals, asso-
ciations or organizations, individually or by conspiracy, from prohibiting
or interfering with the right of every person to exercise his own religious
belief. This right is codified by Title 42, Section 1983, of the United
States Statutes, which specifically provides for the recovery of damages.
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Since interference with this right cannot be compensated by a remedy
at law through compensation by money, such irreparable injury can be
enjoined by a court of equity. Judge Perry stressed that:
this Court would restrain or regulate any kind of march, regard-
less of color or creed, if the same should be shown to be a viola-
tion of Constitutional rights of individuals that would result in
substantial and irreparable damage or injury to persons or the
community as a whole, and especially if it is shown that the pur-
pose of such marches or demonstrations is to foment racial or
religious discord under the cloak of the right of free speech and
assembly or that, of course, there is likelihood of riot or dis-
order. 46
Judge Perry further held that any individual or group of individuals
or organizations or any representative of a federal, state or municipal
government has standing to bring such action. The Court cited a previous
decision in the Circuit Court of Cook County which restricted the demon-
strations of Martin Luther King for open housing.
147
Judge Perry's historic decree enjoined and restrained the defendants
from conducting or participating with one or more other individuals, in
street or sidewalk marches, meetings, picketing or demonstrations at
any place, within the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division,
which is closer than one-half mile to a Jewish house of worship. The
decree applies to an individual who is clothed in Nazi garb or can be
recognized as a Nazi by means of party paraphernalia, who is carrying a
Nazi placard or symbol, or appears with some form of vehicle or means
of transportation which is decorated with Nazi signs, symbols of para-
phernalia. The restraint did not extend to the mailing of literature. 4 '
No appeal was taken from Judge Perry's decision. Though Rock-
well had indicated he did not desire to appeal the matter, the local
branch of the American Civil Liberties Union offered to assist him. At
the urging of the American Civil Liberties Union, Rockwell reluctantly
agreed to file a notice of appeal along with a petition to prosecute the
appeal in forma pauperis. Kutner then renewed an earlier motion for a
subpoena duces tecum for the defendants to produce all financial records
and membership lists to determine whether the forma pauperis affidavit
was filed in good faith. This master maneuver put Rockwell in a pre-
carious position. The defendants failed to appear on the date set for
hearing by Judge Perry. Rockwell telephoned Kutner on several occa-
sions complaining about the American Civil Liberties Union. The appeals
were then dismissed, and the permanent injunction was made final.
The case is now a precedent in establishing the use of the provisions
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 in restraining the actions and conspiracies
146. Id.
147. Transcript, at 444-45. Citing Chicago v. King, No. 66-4938 (Cir. Ct. Cook County),
148. Transcript, at 449-50.
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by individuals and groups who seek to deprive or to subject to the depri-
vation of others of their constitutional rights. The published memoran-
dum and order by Judge Perry.4 is of great impact because of its suc-
cinctness without belaboring Supreme Court precedents. Though the case
was unprecedented in that action of this type had not been brought pre-
viously, the opinion is a unique beacon light because of no reference to
prior judicial trends. 5° Doctrinaire civil libertarians may protest that
Judge Perry's holding constitutes a delimitation of the exercise of first
amendment rights. Such a position constitutes, what Sidney Hook has
labeled, ritualistic liberalism-the reliance upon rhetoric rather than
logic-slogans rather than the analysis of problems in defense of free-
dom.'' The activities of Rockwell and his so-called Nazi Party did not
constitute free speech but a concerted conspiracy of promoting violence,
the advocacy of murder and genocide, intimidation and ridicule in sub-
jecting minority groups to a deprivation of their constitutional rights. The
framers of the first amendment 52 and Supreme Court decisions'53 have
not condoned the use of speech to disseminate falsehood and defamation.
The doctrine of "prior restraint" is of limited application in this
situation. A Court is not to be prevented from enjoining activities which
lead to an infringement upon the rights of others. An injunction may issue
as a remedy to protect individual rights and to enjoin that which is
contrary to law. However, an impartial hearing must be held with all
litigants presented with an opportunity to be heard. 54
Nevertheless, possible extended applications of this decision should
be of concern to serious civil libertarians. Public demonstrations are a
necessary means for the conveying of ideas, but all such demonstrations
inevitably involve an element of social disruption infringing upon the
rights of individuals and groups as well as upon the functioning of the
community. The use of public thoroughfares inevitably involves police
protection-particularly with regard to demonstrations by groups convey-
ing ideas of public controversy. Thus, an element of state action is in-
volved. Individuals and groups who believe the demonstrations would
result in subjecting them to a deprivation of their constitutional rights
could then obtain standing to commence a class action to enjoin such
activities. The group involved might then be subjected to harassment from
the mere bringing of litigation, especially if it lacks funds for retaining
counsel and to pay court costs. Moreover, the rights of the group would
be subjected to the subjective inclinations of the judge. If he were hostile
149. Jewish War Veterans v. Am. Nazi Party, 260 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Il. 1966).
150. See generally Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J.
421 (1960).
151. S. HOOK, POLITICAL POWER AND PERSONAL FREEDOM, 319 (1962).
152. See generally LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1964).
153. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
154. Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 41 VAND. L. REV. 533, 537-40
(1951).
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to the group's purposes, he might enjoin their activities upon the most
limited finding of public disruption. According to the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Walker v. City of Birmingham,'55 the
group would be compelled to obey the injunction, regardless of its appar-
ent illegality. It would be subjected to the expenses of prosecuting an
appeal, and the delay caused by the litigation would in itself be an effec-
tive means for the restraining of freedom of expression. The timing of a
demonstration is of importance as to its effectiveness; and when this is
interfered with, the effect may be the same as total suppression.
Clearly, the Rockwell precedent should be limited to the facts of
that particular case. The failure of an appeal was unfortunate in that a
higher court might have set forth stricter judicial guidelines. The prece-
dent should not be invoked to enjoin demonstrations and activities by
groups to ventilate ideas seeking social or economic reform, rights for
minority groups of international peace, though a governmental unit
might reasonably regulate such activities with regard to time and place. 5"
The mere fact that a demonstration may cause the presence of a crowd,
an angry reaction, or a certain amount of social disruption should not
justify the issuance of an injunction. The preferred position of the first
amendment means that some potential infringement or deprivation of
human rights does not justify restraint.'5 Even demonstrations expressing
opposition to religious beliefs are to be permitted.'58
However, where a group, like the American Nazi Party or the Ku
Klux Klan, seeks to use the techniques of public demonstrations as part
of a conspiracy and concerted plan of action to deprive political, eco-
nomic, ethnic or religious groups of their rights under the Constitution or
subject individuals or groups to threats of deprivation, the Rockwell prec-
edent may properly be invoked, but only to the extent where, in fact,
such activities do interfere with an individual's or group's civil rights.
Sections 1983 and 1985 and the Rockwell precedent may be properly
invoked by Negro parents to protect their children from picketing or
other forms of intimidation when attending certain previously segregated
schools or by Negroes seeking to reside in certain neighborhoods.
In the Rockwell case, the use of the injunction under Sections 1983
and 1985 proved to be effective in thwarting activities calculated to
create a tense climate of racism. Whether other methods, such as counter-
demonstrations, would have been preferable or more effective can now be
only a matter of speculation. The injunction may well have been a con-
tributing factor in the ultimate dissolution of Rockwell's movement,
though his assassination by John Patler, one of his henchmen (ironically,
a defendant in the case), was undoubtedly the ultimate blow.
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Nevertheless, the seeds from which racism may germinate still
flourish within American and international society; and legal weapons,
like the Rockwell precedent, remain as a part of the arsenal. Clearly,
the advocacy and promotion of belief in genocide and hate do not have
any redeeming social significance nor contribute to the marketplace of
ideas in a free society. Rather, such blatant racism may be regarded as
an aspect of hard-core pornography. The symbol of the swastika and
the death camp tortures are portrayed along with sexual orgy and sadism
as a prominent part of such literature in appealing to prurient instincts
and to a blatant desire of violence for its own sake.159 The appeal of
Rockwell was precisely to these instincts, particularly among college
students who sought to hear him for "kicks." Rockwell's appeal for
recruits, however, was to those elements within American society who
have limited education and find themselves drifting without social pur-
pose, like the motorcycle gang. Movements like Rockwell's American
Nazi Party provided them with a psychological outlet. They are particu-
larly susceptible to the themes of sex, sadism and violence as portrayed
by obscene literature.
The Courts have recognized that obscenity does not enjoy first
amendment protection,16° so that hard-core pornography may be regu-
lated. It is suggested that the writings and utterances of racists like the
late George Lincoln Rockwell may also be regarded as hard-core pornog-
raphy. Nevertheless, the needs of a free society require that such restric-
tions be carefully applied.'
Legal redress, however, can only attack the symptoms of racism. The
ultimate solution lies in attacking the underlying psychological and
sociological tensions which give rise to these ugly manifestations. This
requires an evaluation of basic social norms and an attack on social
problems, such as the frustration of the inhabitants of ghettos, the eco-
nomic insecurity of the middle class, the tensions of international conflict
and the distrust generated by the credibility gap, and the problem of
giving meaning to human life.
Kutner, as an advocate preoccupied merely with seeking legal re-
dress in this instance, was precluded from giving attention to these
underlying problems. Perhaps, however, these are matters for specialists
in other fields. Kutner has long urged seminars to distill all problems
of this ever present vexatious subject.
CONCLUSION
Luis Kutner's writings and cases demonstrate how an advocate may
function as lawmaker. However, in representing a client, Kutner, as any
159. Davidowicz, Smut and Anti-Semitism, 14 MIDSTREAm 71 (1968); Davidowicz,
Intergroup Relations and Tensions in the United States, 68 Am. JEWISH YEARBOOK 69
(1967) ; Steiner, Pornography and the Consequences, ENCOUNTER, March. 1966, at 46-47.
160. Redruy v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957).
161. Luros v. United States, 389 F.2d 200 (8th Cir. 1968).
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other advocate, must limit the breadth of the issues presented to the
court so that the best interests of his client will be served. His primary
obligation is to serve the client, with considerations as to the making of
law becoming secondary. Nevertheless, in his capacity as advocate he
presents perspectives which the judge would otherwise ignore in making
a decision. The advocate's role clearly has an institutional function within
the judicial process.162 But the judge arrives at his decision within the
institutional context. Though ideological preconceptions influence judicial
decision-making, there is an element of fluidity as judges, especially on
the Supreme Court, change their minds within a situational context.
Kutner, as all other advocates, assumes a role in the judicial process by
contributing to the situational context.
The advocate as writer is freer to contribute to lawmaking. Kutner,
in his pioneering institutional writings, does not have the obligations of
immediately serving the needs of a particular client and is, therefore,
within a more flexible position in raising issues affecting the course of
lawmaking. His writings contribute to the ferment of legal opinion-making
to be invoked by judges as part of the reasoning in the decision-making
process within situational contexts as they arise and by legislators in
considering legal reform. Kutner's prescriptive creative writings, in the
area of international law, contribute to a ferment for the international
decision-makers in vindicating the rights of the individual in international
law. Here, too, a ferment is created for at least quasi-judicial decision-
making in situational contexts, such as the detentions of Cardinal Joseph
Mindszenty, William N. Oatis and Moise Tshombe and in tending to be
established as a subject rather than object of international law.
In addition to his function in contributing to the making of law, the
advocate, as demonstrated by Kutner's career, also assumes a role analo-
gous to that of the Ombudsman, an institution established originally in
the Scandinavian countries which has been adapted in other legal systems
for providing a check upon arbitrary bureaucratic action.6 3 The formal-
ization of judicial and administrative procedures leads to a depersonaliza-
tion of the bureaucratic process. The advocate, acting independently of
the formalized processes, is able to focus upon the individual case and
to restore the personal element to the governmental process. In repre-
senting his client, he focuses upon the arbitrary result of certain cases,
such as in the Stephens case and thereby causes the rectification of a
wrong and the adoption of new rules to avoid the perpetration of future
wrongs. The advocate, in representing his client to right an injustice, may
also resort to informal or extra-legal procedures, as in the Boyd case,
where the withdrawal of the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus re-
sulted in the release of the accused through personal contacts by the
162. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 39-41 (Berman ed.
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federal and state members of the judiciary. However, it was the advocate's
initiation of the action which was the catalyst.
Cases of the type handled by Kutner (and other advocates) clearly
demonstrate the need for the establishment of the institution of Ombuds-
man within the governmental process, to act as an independent check
upon arbitrary administrative and judicial action and to restore the
personal element to the administrative process. The individual who is
wronged should have ready recourse to such an Ombudsman. To rely
upon the chance intervention by an advocate, like Kutner, to eliminate
injustice provides a backstop of only limited effect. However, even the
establishment of the Ombudsman will not eliminate the role of the inde-
pendent advocate whose purpose will still remain to supplement such
governmental functions. Moreover, the Ombudsman, as a governmental
institution, may itself become bureaucratized and impersonal. The inde-
pendent advocate would then emerge as a check.
The confines of this paper do not permit a consideration of the
advocate's personality structure, and the full Kutner personality cannot
justly be considered in this r6sum6. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the
advocate depends upon his personal traits. To some, Kutner may appear
to be arrogant and egoistic. But these are traits required by an advocate
who must have confidence in his abilities and legal reasoning and cre-
ativity. Indeed, when Kutner represents a client or champions a cause,
he becomes obsessed with the task, assuming a stance of self-righteous-
ness. He becomes indignant with those standing in his way who fail to
see the righteousness of the cause, such as a man wrongly convicted or
a child arbitrarily taken from his parents. He exerts all his efforts to
see that justice will prevail, despite the obstacles in his path. To Kutner,
where the sense of injustice collides with intrenched legal principles, the
latter must give way.
Kutner approaches his causes with the flair for the dramatic. He
has many of the attributes of an actor, and indeed has persons associated
with the theater and other entertainment media as his clients and asso-
ciates. However, law itself is similar to the theater with the advocates as
actors in the judicial process seeking to influence the judge and jury who
comprise the audience.
As the advocate influencing judicial decision-making, Kutner exem-
plifies the highest courage and persistence and skill to swim against the
current. Once having chosen his aim, he expends himself recklessly upon
it in search of a moral legal order based on individual judgment and
individual responsibility.
Visionaries like Kutner profess to become adept at institutional
manipulation, expending enormous power of fashioning good from evil.
Kutner's mind cannot support legal-moral chaos for long. He is under
strong compulsion to improvise or invent a legal-ethical setting for dis-
ruptive behavior. He seeks to erect new cosmogenies out of the archaic
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ruins of sterile social systems. His macrocosmic writings profess to be
realistic and concrete creations of a world view for future generations.
Being fundamentally informed of an accurate picture of the society in
which he lives, his contributions are unequivocally humanitarian. He de-
cries the faults and weaknesses of society. He strives to mitigate the
domination of man by men. To him the life of a nation, the world, or of
a man depends upon the competence of the cosmos concept of the Rule
of Law.
The expanding influence of Kutner's innovations, catalyzing other
pioneers, will enable man to develop his personality and to order his own
life. To Kutner, the societas perfecta cannot be achieved by merely ac-
knowledging human rights and fundamental freedoms in fine-sounding
words in national constitutions and international declarations and con-
ventions. Word-phrases, evolved into principles, must be applied in behav-
ioral legislation and legal practice in a manner permitting man, as a
rational being, to freely develop his personality, to exercise his rights, and
to order his own life.
The rule of life must be in balance with the rule of law.
